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Abstract
Due to increases in life expectancy and decreases in fertility rates, pension plans around
the world are facing sustainability challenges. Pension sponsors are shifting risks back to
employees by moving away from Defined Benefit (DB) plans to Defined Contribution (DC)
plans. However, since members bear all of the inflation risk, the investment risk, and the
longevity risk, there is growing concern about the financial security offered through DC
plans. Hybrid pension plans, which combine features of both DC and DB plans, may
be able to meet the needs of employer and employee better than DC or DB individually.
Numerous hybrid pension designs have been proposed. Examples include Cash Balance
plans, DB Underpin plans, Second-Election plans, Collective DC plans and Target Benefit
plans. Although the overall hybrid pension market remains small compared to either DC
or DB plans, their significance is growing.
Generally speaking, there are four stakeholder groups involved in any occupational
pension plans: the pension sponsor, the active employees, the retirees and the regulatory
authority. The aim of my thesis is to study different types of risk allocation strategies
between stakeholders in the hybrid pension plans.
Three different hybrid designs are considered in this thesis. Chapter 1 studies the risk
management of Cash Balance (CB) pension plans, which are the most popular hybrid plans
in U.S. We show that the simple delta and gamma hedging is effective in mitigating the
interest rate risk embedded in the CB liabilities. Chapter 2 introduces a new pension design
based on two existing hybrid plans - the second election option and the DB underpin plan.
We demonstrate how our new plan is able to provide more income security to the retirees
without incurring large costs on top of the other two existing hybrid plans. Chapter 3
explores the optimal design for intergenerational risk sharing plans. We demonstrate the
necessity to incorporate regulatory constraints to ensure the generational fairness. The
last chapter concludes the thesis, and proposes future work in hybrid pension designs.
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Introduction
Over the past few decades, traditional Defined Benefit (DB) and Defined Contribution
(DC) plans have revealed their shortcomings in providing adequate and stable retirement
income. Many existing DB plans are facing sustainability issues, and current employees
are not expecting to receive their promised retirement income in full. On the other hand,
members in the DC plans suffer great uncertainty in both account accumulation and de-
cumulation phases. As a result, there is a growing interest in searching for alternative
pension structures to control the variability in both contributions and benefits; those plans
are generally referred to as Hybrid Pension plans.
The aim of my thesis is to study different types of hybrid pension designs, specifically,
Cash Balance pension plans, the Early Exercise DB underpin plans, and a stylized In-
tergenerational Risk Sharing plan. The topics covered include liability hedging, liability
valuation, and optimal pension structure.
Chapter 1 presents the performance of dynamic hedging strategies for Cash Balance
(CB) pension plans. The CB design is increasing in popularity in the U.S. market, with
more than 12 million participants in 2016. It preserves the portability of DC plan with
market risk being shared between employees and sponsor. Our study is motivated by
Hardy et al. (2014), which studies market consistent valuation of CB plans. Harvey (2012)
shows that the common view from the industry that CB plans have low risk is in fact a
misbelief. There are substantial interest rate risks associated with CB liabilities, and our
task is to explore whether such risks can be managed. In this chapter, we consider delta
and gamma hedging strategies, which are simple to implement and are consistent with our
valuation technique. We demonstrate their effectiveness in mitigating interest rate risk.
Chapter 2 introduces a new hybrid pension design, the Early Exercise DB Underpin
plan. The intuition behind the new pension scheme is inspired by two existing hybrid
pension designs: the DB underpin plan and the second election plan. The sponsors of DB
underpin plans grant a minimum guarantee on top of a DC plan at the retirement date.
Thus, the downside market risk is shared between employees and sponsor. The second
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election option is a one-time option that allows the members to switch between DC and
DB plan at anytime prior to the retirement date. Any transition cost will be borne by
the employee. One significant drawback of the second election plan is the possibility of a
“lose-lose” situation where the cumulative cost incurred is higher than either the DB or
the DC plan but the employees receive less benefit. This motivates us to incorporate a
minimum guarantee at the switching time, which is similar to a DB underpin plan with
early exercise option. Since the new plan is a natural link between the second election plan
and the DB underpin plan, we will jointly study the three plans and analyze their pros
and cons.
Chapter 3 explores optimal design for intergenerational risk sharing (IRS) pension plans
under which the investment and the longevity risks are shared between active employees
and retirees. Most of the IRS plans are in their preliminary discussion stage. They are
also known as collective DC plans, conditional indexation plans, defined ambition plans
and target benefit plans. Our study is based on a stylized plan suggested by Cui et al.
(2011). Both contributions and pension rights are adjustable based on the level of pension
asset. We formulate an ergodic control problem to ensure the stability of member’s lifetime
consumption. We provide a natural extension to the original plan with theoretical justifi-
cation. In addition, we illustrate the importance of including the regulatory requirements
for the sake of fairness across different generations.
Chapter 4 presents the possible directions for future research in hybrid pension plans.
2
Chapter 1
Cash Balance Pension - Dynamic
Hedging
1.1 Introduction
Cash Balance (CB) pensions represent the fastest growing pension plan design in the US,
according to Kravitz (2018). The number of CB plans has increased from around 3% to
37% of all Defined Benefit (DB) plans since 2001. In 2016 there were 20,452 CB plans in
the US, with a total of around 12 million participants.
CB plans are classified and regulated as DB plans but are presented to look very much
like Defined Contribution (DC) plans. For example, participants have individual accounts
showing their up-to-date accrued benefits. However, an important difference between CB
and DC plans is that employee accounts in the CB plan are notional. The assets are not
allocated to individuals and the amounts paid into the aggregated plan funds need not
be equal to the notional contributions. The total funds invested are generally not equal
to the sum of the employee accounts, and are often substantially smaller because of the
actuarial funding methods used, and because DB plans are not required to be fully funded
(see Hardy et al. (2014)). The individual member accounts are notionally accumulated
at the specified plan crediting rate, which may be a fixed rate, or a variable rate such as
the current yield on government bonds of specified term. In this chapter we focus on the
30-year Treasury crediting rate; it is one of the most common options, (covering around
24% of plans (34% of plans with more than 100 participants), according to Kravitz (2018)).
The original motivation for the CB plan design was to replicate the lower risk properties
of DC plans within a DB plan. CB plans started gaining popularity in the mid-1990s;
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Niehaus and Yu (2005) explain that in 1990s, companies switching from traditional DB
plans favored CB plans over DC, to avoid the high reversion tax applied to excess pension
assets. Coronado and Copeland (2004) on the other hand conclude that the conversions
from traditional DB to CB were primarily driven by the labor market conditions. In 2015,
new regulations came into effect clarifying and extending the permitted range of crediting
rate formulae1.
Until recently, CB plans have been considered by sponsors and most actuaries to be low
risk, low volatility plans. The views expressed by the consultants at Kravitz are typical,
for example:
“Cash balance plans remove the interest rate risk that led to constantly changing value
of liabilities in traditional defined benefit plans.”(Kravitz (2018))
More recently, there has been a greater recognition of the inherent risk involved in
guaranteeing returns. In a 2015 report, Segal Rogerscasey wrote:
“Cash balance plans do not represent a low-risk arbitrage opportunity, but rather are
a leveraged investment in risk assets, similar to a traditional DB plan.” (Rogerscasey
(2015)).
Hedging the cash balance liability has become a more urgent question as the low inter-
est rate environment has persisted so long that rising costs and risks cannot be ignored.
Even the traditional actuarial funding approach, which is highly unresponsive to market
conditions, is beginning to generate unexpected strains and volatility.
The major objective of this chapter is to derive and quantitatively explore the efficacy
of a hedging strategy based on financial engineering models and principles. We base the
hedge on the market valuation of the liability, rather than the actuarial valuation. There
are two reasons for this. The first is that the application of traditional actuarial valuation
methods to CB plans generates an ‘actuarial liability’ that is quite unrelated to the short
or long term costs. Both Murphy (2001) and Hardy et al. (2014) conclude that traditional
methods may significantly understate the actual liability for participants who terminate
early, and tend to generate losses even where the participant exits at the assumed age.
Market valuation methods are more objective than actuarial methods and the valuation
and hedging formulae are inextricably linked; the valuation formula can be used to derive
the hedging portfolio for a risk. In Hardy et al. (2014) explicit valuation formulae were
derived in the case where the crediting rate is the k-year spot rate, and where interest
crediting applies continuously. Thus, the valuation results give us a starting point for
determining a hedge strategy.
1Internal Revenue Bulletin, T.D.9743, 2015-48 I.R.B.679, “Transitional Amendments to Satisfy the
Market Rate of Return Rules for Hybrid Retirement Plans”.
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In practice CB crediting rates based on treasury bonds use the yield to maturity (YTM),
not spot rates. The same valuation framework that we used for spot rates can be applied
to the YTM, but the valuation requires Monte Carlo simulation. Hardy et al. (2014)
showed that the numerical results using the spot rate valuation formulae were a good
approximation for the YTM valuation. In this chapter we show that the same is true for
hedging strategies based on spot rates and YTMs. We also use this chapter to extend
the valuation formulae in Hardy et al. (2014) to the case where the interest crediting is
discrete.
Market consistent valuation techniques have been studied for other pension-related
liabilities; examples can be found in Boyle and Hardy (2003), Marshall (2011) and Chen
and Hardy (2009). Despite the fact that US public and private sector pension plans
have not (yet) adopted market consistent valuation, much of the recent pensions literature
has discussed the benefit of using market values to assess objectively the funding status of
pension plans. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) and Biggs (2010) recalculate the funding ratios
of US public pensions to market-consistent benchmarks, and conclude that the subjectivity
of traditional actuarial techniques significantly understates the liabilities, and overstates
the funding rates. Moreover, Biggs and Smetters (2013) outline common misconceptions
about using a long-term market rate as the discount rate for pension liabilities. In this
chapter, we reinforce the advantage of market consistent valuation from a risk management
perspective, as it provides a natural approach not only to the valuation, but also to the
appropriate investment strategies to hedge the interest rate risk.
The CB payoff based on treasury bond crediting rates can be viewed as an interest
rate derivative. Compare to pricing of interest rate derivatives, hedging tends to be more
sensitive to the model risk. Hardy et al. (2014) show that the price of the CB payoff
evaluated using the one factor Hull-White (HW) model is very close to the price evaluated
with the two-factor HW model. However, that may not be the case for the hedge strategy.
Several researchers have examined how many factors are required for effective hedging of
interest rate risks. Fan et al. (2001) studied up to four factor models in the swaption mar-
ket and conclude that although low-dimensional models are capable of accurately pricing
swaptions, they are not sufficient for hedging purposes. Gupta and Subrahmanyam (2005)
and Driessen et al. (2003) draw a similar conclusion for the cap/floor market. Their work
is closer to ours, as they used delta hedging strategies, whereas Fan et al. (2001) focus on
bucket hedging.
Other research on hedging CB liabilities includes Brown et al. (2001), who studied
a duration based hedging strategy, and Harvey (2012), who discussed the difficulties in
calculating the duration of a CB plan, and outlined several practical investment strategies
including credit default swaps, Treasury futures and swaptions, but without supporting
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theoretical or empirical analysis.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the as-
sumptions, notation and models we adopt in this chapter, and also the valuation formulae.
Section 1.3 presents the construction of hedging portfolios. Section 1.4 describes the accu-
mulated hedge error, which we use to measure hedge effectiveness. Section 1.5 examines
the hedge error arising from discrete rebalancing, without model or parameter risk. In
Section 1.6 we consider the impact of model and parameter error by analyzing the hedging
effectiveness using real historical interest rates. In Section 1.7 we consider basis risk, by
comparing the results using a spot rate crediting rate, which is the more tractable ap-
proach, with results using the YTM crediting rate which is what is used in practice. In
Section 1.8 we briefly compare the results of hedging with results where the assets are
invested in a traditional DB equity/bond portfolio and in Section 1.9 we introduce early
exits through a brief example. Section 1.10 concludes.
1.2 Model and Assumptions
In this section we outline the formulae and assumptions used for valuing the cash balance
pension liability, following Hardy et al. (2014) and Zhu (2015).
1.2.1 The CB Accrued Benefit
This chapter focuses on interest rate risk; in this section we ignore demographic risk, but
we will consider early exits in Section 1.9. Treating the individual CB account balance at
retirement as a contingent payment, the market value of the liability is the risk neutral
expectation of the discounted payoff at termination.
Our valuation approach is accrual based, and so are all the hedging strategies we con-
struct. Under the accruals principle (equivalent to unit credit in a traditional pension
plan), the accrued liability is based only on past contributions. Future notional contribu-
tions into the plan can be each regarded as a separate derivative which will be evaluated
and hedged in the same way as the existing account value at the time of payment. This
means that our problem is to hedge the interest rate risk arising from the application of
future, unknown crediting rates, to the current notional account value.
Viewing the pension plan as a whole, the hedge portfolio will comprise hedges based on
a range of accrued funds and times to exit, but to illustrate we consider a single employee
fund, with a T -year term to exit from the valuation date.
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We denote by Ft the notional account value at time t, based on a fixed notional account
value of F0 at t = 0, and ignoring notional contributions after t = 0. The frequency of
interest crediting varies between plans, but the most common choice is annual crediting.
Let ic(s) denote the crediting rate applied in the year s to s+ 1. The exit date (which we
assume is known in advance) is denoted T . The lump-sum payment at the retirement date





For the continuous crediting case we let rc(s) denote the continuously compounded
crediting rate at time s, so that for 0 < t ≤ T




The formulae for valuation and hedging are more straightforward for the continuous
crediting case than for the discrete, so in the main part of the chapter we present the
formulae and results using continuous crediting. The formulae for the discrete case are
derived alongside the continuous versions in the appendices.
As in Hardy et al. (2014), we develop our results assuming that the crediting rate at
t is equal to the k-year spot rate from the US government bond yield curve at that time.
This is a convenient and reasonably accurate approximation to the most common form of
crediting rate, that is the yield to maturity on k-year government bonds ((Kravitz, 2018)),
with k = 30 being the most popular choice, and this is the rate used throughout the
numerical illustrations in this chapter.
1.2.2 The Valuation Formula
Let r(t) denote the continuously compounded short rate of interest at time t, let P (t, T )
denote the price at t of a zero coupon bond with face value of $1, which matures at time
T , and let rk(t) denote the k-year spot rate at time t. Then








where EQt denotes the risk neutral expectation given the information at t.
The market consistent value at time t of the payoff FT due at time T ≥ t is the expected



















If rc(t) and r(t) are independent, for example if the crediting rate is a constant, this
becomes a simple formula. In the case where rc(t) is based on treasury rates at t, there
is a strong dependence between the crediting rate and the short rate, and so we use a
stochastic model of the yield curve for the joint distribution of rc(s) and r(s).
We define the valuation factor V (t, T ) as the market value at time t per $1 in the
participant’s account balance at time t, where the benefit matures at time T ≥ t; that is








1.2.3 Short Rate Models
We use both the One-Factor and Two-Factor versions of the Hull-White (HW) model.
Both of these are well recognized models; both allow a perfect match between the model
and market starting yield curve, and both offer convenient analytical tractability2. For the
one-factor HW model, the instantaneous short rate under the risk-neutral measure has the
following SDE:
dr(t) = (θ(t)− ar(t))dt+ σdW (t), r(0) = r0
where a > 0, σ > 0 are constant, θ(t) is a deterministic function chosen to match the
market term structure at the starting date, W (t) is a standard Brownian motion under
the Q measure, and r0 is the observed short rate at time 0.
2One disadvantage of these models is that the short rate has a Gaussian distribution, with the possibility
of being negative, but Hardy et al. (2014) show that this does not have a significant impact on the valuation
factor.
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There are two common parameterizations for the two-factor HW model. The one we
adopt here is commonly referred to as G2++ (Brigo and Mercurio (2007)). The dynamics
of the instantaneous short rate under Q are
r(t) = x(t) + y(t) + ϕ(t), r(0) = r0
dx(t) = −a1x(t)dt+ σ1dW1(t), x(0) = 0
dy(t) = −a2y(t)dt+ σ2dW2(t), y(0) = 0
dW1(t)dW2(t) = ρdt
where r0 is the initial observed short rate, a1, a2, σ1,σ2 are all positive constants, ϕ(t) is
the deterministic function used to match the initial term structure, and (W1(t),W2(t)) is a
two-dimensional Brownian motion under the Q measure, with correlation ρ, −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
The normality assumption of the short rate allows us to derive the valuation factors
explicitly under both continuous and discrete crediting settings. The formulae are given
in Appendix A. Interested readers can refer to Hardy et al. (2014) and Zhu (2015) for
more detailed derivations and Brigo and Mercurio (2007) (Ch 3 & 4) for general pricing
problems with one- and two- factor HW.
1.3 Constructing the Dynamic Hedging Portfolio
Delta hedging strategy attempts to neutralize the movement of the derivative price relative
to the underlying asset. It is constructed naturally from the market-consistent valuation. In
the case when delta itself is volatile, an additional Greek, Gamma, should be incorporated.
In this section, we develop hedging strategies for a CB plan with crediting rate equal to
the 30-year spot rate on Treasuries. We develop and compare three different strategies.
1. A delta hedge under the one-factor Hull-White model (requires two assets).
2. A delta-gamma hedge under the one-factor Hull-White model (requires three assets).
3. A delta hedge under the two-factor Hull-White model (requires three assets).
The hedging instruments we use are a money market account, with return equal to the
short rate, and Treasury STRIPs of varying length. In practice, hedging with Treasury
STRIPs may be impractical due to the size of the STRIPs market, but the techniques may




The delta and gamma for a particular security are defined as the first and second order
derivatives respect to the underlying risk factor. Here we provide the delta and gamma for
the CB liability (subscript V ) and for the zero coupon bond price (subscript B) under the
one-factor HW model. In the following, recall that t > 0 is the valuation date, T ≥ t is the
exit date, and k is the assumed term of the spot rate used as a crediting rate under the
plan. The explicit solutions for the zero coupon bond price P (t, T ) (defined in equation
(1.1)) and for the valuation factor V (t, T ) (defined in equation (1.2)) are given in Appendix
A.
∆B(t) =
∂P (t, T )
∂r(t)
= −B(a, T − t)P (t, T ) (1.3)
∆V (t) =
∂V (t, T )
∂r(t)
= −γ(a, k)B(a, T − t)V (t, T ) (1.4)
ΓB(t) =
∂2P (t, T )
∂r(t)2
= B(a, T − t)2P (t, T ) (1.5)
ΓV (t) =
∂2P (t, T )
∂r(t)2
= γ(a, k)2B(a, T − t)2V (t, T ) (1.6)
where B(a, s) =
1− e−as
a
and γ(a, k) = 1− B(a, k)
k
Under the two-factor HW model, the deltas for the CB liability and for the zero coupon
bond are the first partial derivatives with respect to each stochastic driver (x and y).
∆xB(t) = −B(a1, T − t)P (t, T )
∆yB(t) = −B(a2, T − t)P (t, T )
∆xV (t) = −γ(a1, k)B(a1, T − t)V (t, T )
∆yV (t) = −γ(a2, k)B(a2, T − t)V (t, T )
Analogous formulae for discrete crediting are given in Appendix A.3.
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1.3.2 Positions in hedging instruments
The hedging instruments we use for delta hedging under the one-factor HW model are the
money market account, with return equal to the short rate, and a zero-coupon bond with
maturity T1.
For delta-gamma hedging under the one-factor HW model and for delta hedging under
the two-factor HW model, we need a third asset, so we add another zero-coupon bond
with maturity T2 6= T1. The position in each instrument can be obtained by solving linear
equation(s). For example, for delta hedging under the one-factor HW model, we solve for
the position in the T1-year zero coupon bond (Λ
HW
1 (t)) as:
∆V (t) = ∆B(t, T1)Λ
HW
1 (t) = −B(a, T − t)P (t, T )ΛHW1 (t) from (1.3)
⇒ −B(a, T − t)P (t, T )ΛHW1 (t) = −γ(a, k)B(a, T − t)V (t, T ) from (1.4)
⇒ ΛHW1 =
γ(a, k)B(a, T − t)V (t, T )
B(a, T1 − t)P (t, T1)
Similarly, for delta-gamma hedging with the one-factor HW model, the position in the
T1-year zero coupon bond (Λ
HW





γ(a, k)B(a, T − t)(γ(a, k)B(a, T − t)−B(a, T2 − t))V (t, T )
B(a, T1 − t)(B(a, T1 − t)−B(a, T2 − t))P (t, T1)
ΛHW2 =
γ(a, k)B(a, T − t)(γ(a, k)B(a, T − t)−B(a, T1 − t))V (t, T )
B(a, T2 − t)(B(a, T2 − t)−B(a, T1 − t))P (t, T2)
For delta-hedging with the two-factor HW model, the position in the T1-year zero




(γ(a1, k)B(a1, T − t)B(a2, T2 − t)− γ(a2, k)B(a2, T − t)B(a1, T2 − t))V (t, T )
(B(a1, T1 − t)B(a2, T2 − t)−B(a2, T1 − t)B(a1, T2 − t))P (t, T1)
ΛG22 =
(γ(a1, k)B(a1, T − t)B(a2, T1 − t)− γ(a2, k)B(a2, T − t)B(a1, T1 − t))V (t, T )
(B(a1, T2 − t)B(a2, T1 − t)−B(a1, T1 − t)B(a2, T2 − t))P (t, T2)
In each case, the amount invested in the bank account S(t) equals the difference between
the liability value and the total value of the position in zero coupon bonds.
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For simplicity, in our numerical illustrations, we select the first zero coupon bond
duration, T1 to be the same maturity as the horizon of the liability, and select the longest
maturity zero coupon bond available for T2 (30-year for the U.S. Treasury Strip market).
We have performed experiments with other choices of T1 and T2 and our main conclusion
remains valid.
1.3.3 Estimating the Parameters
In both Hardy et al. (2014) and Zhu (2015), the same parameters are used. For the
one-factor HW model, we used α = 0.02, σ = 0.006, and for the two-factor model, we used
a1 = 0.055, a2 = 0.108, σ1 = 0.032, σ2 = 0.044, ρ = −0.9999
These parameters indicate a long term, unconditional standard deviation for the short rate
of 3% per year, and for the 30-year rate of around 2.3% per year. Notice that the correlation
ρ is close to negative one, which implies that the two-factor model is in some sense very
close to an one-factor model. However, this one-factor model is not equivalent to the one-
factor HW whenever a1 6= a2 (see Brigo and Mercurio (2007)). Gurrieri et al. (2009), Gupta
and Subrahmanyam (2005) and Brigo and Mercurio (2007) all note that ρ may become
highly negative depending on the calibration instruments and the calibration dates. The
parameter values shown above imply a long-term unconditional standard deviation for the
short rate that is close to experience over the past 30-40 years.
In Section 1.5, we will assess the effectiveness of delta and delta-gamma hedging strate-
gies by applying them to CB liabilities maturing in the period 2005-2015. It would not
be appropriate to use the parameters above to examine the hypothetical effectiveness of
the hedging strategies over this testing period, as the parameters were derived using that
same data. To test whether the hedge strategy would have been effective, we should only
use information available at the time that hedge portfolio is constructed. The parameters
used should be consistent with the data available at the assumed initial valuation; we also
consider the possibility that the parameters could be updated between the initial valuation
and the termination date.
The most common choices of market derivatives used for calibration of interest rate
models are caps and swaptions. We use swaptions as they contain more information on
the correlations between forward rates, which is critical in our application (see Brigo and
Mercurio (2007)). The choice of the number of swaptions used in the calibration strongly
affects the parameter values (especially on a1 and a2). For example, Gurrieri et al. (2009)
compare the calibration results using three sets of swaptions for the one-factor HW with
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time-varying mean reversion and volatility. We use at-the-money swaptions with expiration
dates between one year and the maturity of the CB liability. The tenor of the swaptions
are chosen to be 30 years, with quarterly payments3. We set the model parameters by
minimizing the sum of the relative squared difference between the theoretical swaption





model implied swaption pricei −market swaption pricei
market swaption pricei
)2
For the two-factor model, to distinguish between the parameters of the two stochastic
drivers, we set constraints as
0 < a2 < a1 < 1, 0 < σ1, σ2 < 0.5, −1 < ρ < 1
The upper bounds for the parameters a and σ ensure the optimization does not result in
highly unrealistic values, the choice of σ < 0.5 is arbitrarily chosen with the prior belief
that the actual volatility is much less than 0.5.
There exist closed-form solutions for swaption prices under the one and two factor HW
models. However, the calibration is computationally expensive. Here we adopt the approx-
imation proposed by Schrager and Pelsser (2006), which greatly simplifies the formulae for
swaption prices with sufficient accuracy (for parameter values in our study, the relative
difference in the swaption prices is at most 2%).
3The swaption data are quoted as a Black-volatility matrix and are obtained from Bloomberg.
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Figure 1.1: Calibrated parameters for the one-factor HW based on swaption prices, 2000-
2015.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 present the parameters that calibrated using the swaption data on
each date. At first glance, the estimated parameters for the two-factor HW model do not
match with the estimated parameters for the one-factor HW model. Indeed, the variance
of future short rates under these two sets of parameters differs significantly. The reason is
that the swaptions we used for calibration are focused on the long rates over the next five
years. In fact, the two sets of parameters imply a close match for the variance of spot rates
with long maturity in the next one to five years. Also, notice that all calibrated parameters
are somewhat volatile, especially for the two-factor HW model (where parameters are often
close to the constraints). This phenomenon has been observed elsewhere in the literature
(for example, Enev (2011) and Gurrieri et al. (2009)). In Section 1.6 we will apply the
hedging strategies derived from these models and parameters to real world interest rate
paths; we will demonstrate that in spite of the volatility in the implied parameters, the
hedging strategies can nevertheless be quite effective.
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Figure 1.2: Calibrated Parameters for Two-Factor HW (volatility and correlation only)
based on swaption prices, 2000-2015.
1.4 Hedging Performance Metrics
Under certain theoretical assumptions, a dynamic hedging strategy with no transaction
costs can perfectly replicate the liability. However, this is impossible in practice, and the
difference between the liability and the replicating instrument value is the hedge error.
The hedge error comes from two main sources: the fact that hedges are rebalanced dis-
cretely, not continuously as the theory requires, and from the difference between the model
and parameters assumed, and the actual real world interest rate process. There are also
additional potential errors from transaction costs, but these are not very significant here
because fees for trading government bonds are assumed to be very low. See Zhu (2015) for
more details.
In Section 1.5, we quantify the discrete hedge error by considering weekly, monthly
and annual re-balancing, where the monthly case serves as the benchmark, and where we
eliminate the impact of model and parameter risk, by using the hedging model, adapted
for the market price of risk, to generate the simulated “real world” interest paths.
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In Section 1.6 we examine the model and parameter risk by testing the hedging strate-
gies derived from our models, using historical paths of crediting rates and yield curves,
assuming crediting rates are treasury spot rates.
The approach in Section 1.6 introduces basis risk, from the fact that we are assuming
spot crediting rates, where the real liability is the yield to maturity (YTM). In Section 1.7
we investigate the basis risk by considering the difference between the spot rate hedge and
the YTM liability.
1.4.1 Accumulated Maturity Hedging Error (MHE)
We let H(t) denote the value of the hedge portfolio at time t, given the participant remains
in the plan. By definition, on rebalancing dates we have H(t) = V (t) = Ft V (t, T ). Let
H(t−) denote the value of the hedge portfolio at time t immediately before re-balancing,
and we let E(t) denote the hedge error at time t.
E(t) = V (t)−H(t−)
Assuming that at each re-balancing date, we invest/borrow the amount equal to the hedge







Here we want to mention that MHE is not the only reasonable metric to measure the
hedging effective, but MHE has the interpretation advantage at maturity date since it is
naturally developed from a valid hedging strategy (risk-free investment of E(t)). It is also
possible to examine the performance from the starting date, which means to discount the
hedge error at each rebalancing date to the present value, see Hardy (2003) for details.
1.5 Evaluating discrete rebalancing hedging errors
The distribution of hedge errors arising from discrete rebalancing can be obtained by
generating a large number of random sample paths for the future crediting rate under the
real-world probability measure, then calculating the maturity hedge error for each sample
path, based on a notional fund of $1000 at the start of the simulation.
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We use 10,000 paths under a P -measure model for future interest rates that is a simple
shift of the assumed risk neutral model, to allow for the market price of risk. For details
see Björk (2009). All other model assumptions are the same for the random paths and
for the hedging and valuation model, so we are isolating the effect of discrete rebalancing
without considering model, parameter or basis risk, which are all considered in subsequent
sections.
Specific assumptions for both this section and Section 1.6 are:
• The crediting rate is the k = 30-year treasury spot rate
• We are hedging the payoff from a CB plan, based on the notional account F0 = $1000
at the initial valuation date, and assuming the participant exits T = 5 years later.
We ignore additional notional contributions between the valuation date and the exit
date.
• The hedge instruments at t for the one-factor HW model with delta hedging, are the
money market and a pure discount bond with T1 = T − t years remaining.
• The hedge instruments at t for the one-factor HW model with delta-gamma hedging,
and for the two factor HW model with delta hedging, are the money market, a pure
discount bond with T1 = T − t years remaining, and another pure discount bond
with T2 = 30− t.
For the market price of risk, we follow the work of PricewaterhouseCoopers (2014),
which assumed a constant market price of risk, denoted λ, estimated through historical
rates from 2001 to 2012. The dynamics of the short rate under the real world measure for
the one-factor HW model are
dr(t) = (θ(t)− ar(t) + λσ)dt+ σdW P (t)
We evaluate λ using historical monthly returns (from 1990 to 2015) on zero coupon bonds
with maturities varying from 5 years to 30 years. The estimates we obtained range from
0.46 to 0.6. We assume that 0.5 would be a reasonable approximation for λ, and since we
use 0.006 for the volatility term, the drift adjustment would be 0.003.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 display the distribution of maturity hedge errors under simulation
using the one-factor HW model, where F0 = $1000. The starting date of the plan (or the
initial term structure) is chosen as at 2009-02-27 (we find that the maturity hedge error is
not very sensitive to the initial term structure). Immediately, we observe that increasing
17
the frequency of the re-balancing will reduce the overall hedge loss, as we expect. Also, for
delta hedging, the effect of switching from annual re-balancing to monthly is much greater
than from monthly to weekly (in both the magnitude and the shape of the distribution).
Most importantly, even for annual re-balancing, the maturity hedge error for a 5-year plan
is less than 0.2% for the worst case, which is insignificant compared with other sources of
error (as we shall illustrate in Section 1.6). In terms of terminal funding level, a monthly
hedge frequency replicates the maturity benefit with error less than 0.01%.
We conclude that the impact of discrete hedging error is relatively minor, and in the
following sections where we consider model, parameter, and basis risk we may assume
monthly hedging does not significantly impact the ultimate hedging errors.
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Figure 1.3: Simulation Results for Delta Hedging (One Factor HW), plan started at 2009-
02-27, initial account value F0 = 1000. Annual (top), monthly (middle) and weekly (bot-
tom) rebalancing.
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Figure 1.4: Simulation Results for Gamma Hedging (One Factor HW), plan started at
2009-02-27, initial account value F0 = 1000. Annual (top), monthly (middle) and weekly
(bottom) rebalancing.
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1.6 Evaluating model and parameter error using the
hypothetical historical hedging performance
In this section we consider the same CB plan as in Section 1.5, but instead of using
randomly generated 5-year paths for short rates and crediting rates, we will use a succession
of 5-year paths from the past 15 years, with end dates ranging from 2005 to 2015. That
is, we assume the plan trustees hedge the accrued liability (i.e. past notional accumulated
contributions) assuming all members leave at the end of 5-years from the valuation date4.
We assume monthly rebalancing, based on the results of Section 1.5 which indicate that
this will be sufficiently frequent.
To model the potential impact of different ways of updating the parameters, we show
the results using three different approaches
(i) Constant parameters
(ii) Parameters calibrated at the plan starting date, and then maintained through the
five year term
(iii) Parameters re-calibrated at each hedging date.
Recalibrating will, in principle, affect both the hedge and the valuation factors, but
the impact is very small. In Figure 1.5 we present the valuation factors under different
parameter calibrations and under the different models (one factor or two factors). The
graph demonstrates that the valuation factors are extremely close, meaning that they are
not very dependent on the parameters or on the number of factors.
In Figures 1.6 to 1.8 we show results for each of the different hedging portfolios, with
different approaches to parameter recalibration. For easier comparison, the graphs are all
shown on the same scale. Figure 1.6 shows the results for the delta strategy, using the
one-factor HW model. Figure 1.7 shows the delta-gamma strategy hedging result, still with
the one-factor HW model, and Figure 1.8 shows the delta strategy hedging result using
the two-factor HW model.
From Figure 1.6 we see that the accumulated hedge errors are quite variable, and
the impact of re-calibrating the model is quite significant. Using constant parameters,
the MHE ranges from around +11% (in 2005, 2012) to −4% (in 2008-9) of the terminal
liability (which ranges from around $1180 to $1320). Using parameters that are set at the
4This is somewhat analogous to a partly projected approach to traditional pension valuation.
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Valuation Date




















Valuation Factor - constant parameters (HW)
Valuation Factor - calibrated parameters (HW)
Valuation Factor - constant parameters (G2)
Valuation Factor - calibrated parameters (G2)
Figure 1.5: Valuation Factors evaluated using different parameter calibration approaches,
for Hull-White models using one factor (labelled HW) and two factors (labelled G2).
start of each 5-year term, the errors range from +12% (in 2012) to −4% (in 2008-9). Using
parameters that are recalibrated monthly, the higher end of the range is reduced to around
+6% of the terminal liability.
In Figure 1.7 we see that adding the gamma hedge to the one-factor model has not
significantly improved the hedge accuracy in the constant parameter case, but has improved
the accuracy where the parameters are regularly recalibrated.
In contrast, Figure 1.8 shows that the hedge using the two-factor model is quite robust
to the parameter variability, and overall losses are contained in a range from close to 0%
up to around 5% of the terminal liability.
In Figure 1.9 we show the MHEs for each model, where the hedges were determined
using constant parameters. The most immediate result is that the two factor model appears
to create a much more reliable hedge than the one factor, even though the valuation results
were shown in Hardy et al. (2014) to be very insensitive to the number of factors. However,
the conclusion is less clear when we compare results allowing for recalibration of the model
at each hedging date, as shown in Figure 1.10. Here we see that, although the variability
22
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Calibrated Parameters at Valuation Date
Re-Calibration of Parameters Annually
Re-Calibration of Parameters Monthly
Figure 1.6: Maturity Hedge Loss for CB plan, 5-year horizon, maturing at 2005-2015,
with initial account value F0 = 1000, Delta-Hedging with the one-factor HW Model, using
different parameter calibration approaches.
of hedging errors in the two-factor case is less than either of the one factor cases, the upper
end of the errors are similar – though generated by different market conditions. The one-
factor model does worst through the 2001-2006 period, with declining spreads between long
and short rates. The two factor model is less sensitive to the changing market conditions
up to the crisis; the worst performance covers the period from around 2008 to 2013. We
note also from this graph that the addition of the gamma hedge in the one factor case does
seem to generate improved hedging accuracy.
1.7 Crediting with the yield to maturity
As mentioned in previous sections, in practice a treasury based crediting rate in a CB
plan would use the YTM on treasuries, not the spot rate. This means that there is basis
risk in the analysis in Section 1.6, arising from the difference between the assumed hedge
liability and the actual hedge liability. The reason for using spot rates is tractability;
using YTMs, all the hedging portfolios must be determined using repeated Monte Carlo
simulation. In this section we examine the magnitude of the basis risk by considering the
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Calibrated Parameters at Valuation Date
Re-Calibration of Parameters Annually
Re-Calibration of Parameters Monthly
Figure 1.7: Maturity Hedge Loss for CB plan, 5-year horizon, maturing at 2005-2015, with
initial account value F0 = 1000, Gamma-Hedging with the one-factor HW Model, using
different parameter calibration approaches.
difference between hedging spot crediting rates and hedging YTM crediting rates, with all
other assumptions as in Section 1.6; specifically, 30-year Treasury Bond crediting rates,
5-year hedging horizon, with Hull-White one and two factor interest rate models.
1.7.1 Valuation by Control Variate Method
Unfortunately, there is no closed-form solution available, thus, numerical methods such as
the Monte Carlo method must be implemented. Here we denote yk(t) as the k-year YTM
at time t, which is the annual coupon rate payable semi-annually on a new k-year bond
issued at par at time t:
yk(t) =
2(1− P (t, t+ k))∑2k




Due to the close relationship between the YTM and the spot rate, the valuation factor for
a CB plan using the spot rate can be set as a control variate in the Monte Carlo simulation
for the YTM crediting rate valuation. To measure the effectiveness of the control variate,
24
31-01-2005 31-08-2007 31-03-2010 31-10-2012 30-04-2015
























Calibrated Parameters at Valuation Date
Re-Calibration of Parameters Annually
Re-Calibration of Parameters Monthly
Figure 1.8: Maturity Hedge Loss for CB plan, 5-year horizon, maturing at 2005-2015,
with initial account value F0 = 1000, Delta-Hedging with the two-factor HW Model, using
different parameter calibration approaches.
we use the variance reduction ratio (VRR), which is defined as
VRR =
Var(naive estimator)
Var(estimator with control variate(s))
Figure 1.11 displays the VRRs for different valuation dates. The effectiveness of the
control variate depends on the correlation between the spot rate and the YTM. When the
yield curve is relatively flat, the YTM is close to the long-term spot rate, and the VRR
is almost 15,000. Even when the yield curve is fairly steep the VRR is above 5000. This
implies that the control variate reduces at least 99.98% of the variance of the naive Monte
Carlo method.
Figure 1.12 compares the valuation factors using spot crediting rates and YTM crediting
rates, assuming constant parameters. We note that spot crediting rates have generally
produced larger valuation factors over this period; the difference is usually less than 4%,
but in periods where the yield curve is particularly steep it has been as high as 9%.
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Delta Hedging, One-Factor HW
Delta-Gamma Hedging, One-Factor HW
Delta Hedging, Two-Factor HW
Figure 1.9: MHE for 5-year CB plan maturing at 2005-2015, using constant parameters.
1.7.2 Hedging the YTM crediting rate
To calculate the delta for the YTM valuation factor we adopt the pathwise method (see
Glasserman (2013)), and use the delta from equation (1.4) as the control variate. Although
the variance reduction is not as effective as the valuation factors, VRR remains above 15
(up to 200) for all scenarios. It is important to point out that although the valuation factors
for the spot rate and YTM are close, their Deltas and Gammas may differ significantly.
This is because the sensitivity of the short rate to the YTM is quite different from the
sensitivity of the short rate to the long spot rate. Therefore, it is important to verify if
delta hedging remains effective.
In this section, instead of using treasury STRIPs, we considered more liquid treasury
bonds in our portfolio. All other settings follow exactly as in Section 1.6.
Comparing Figures 1.13 and 1.14 with Figures 1.9 and 1.10, we can observe many
similarities. The shape of the graphs are almost identical, and, as we expected from the
comparison between valuation factors, the absolute value of the MHE is slightly lower for
YTM crediting rates. Importantly, we see that, as for the spot rates, the delta hedge
applied under the one or two factor HW models appears to offer a stable risk management
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Delta Hedging, One-Factor HW
Delta-Gamma Hedging, One-Factor HW
Delta Hedging, Two-Factor HW
Figure 1.10: MHEs for 5-year CB plan maturing at 2005-2015, parameters re-calibrated
monthly.
strategy, with accumulated hedging errors generally less than around 5% of the fund value
at maturity.
1.8 Comparing the Delta hedge strategy with a tra-
ditional investment strategy
One of the initial attractions of CB plans to employers is that by investing in equities,
the employer could pay less than the notional contribution rate (as % of pay), since the
additional return on equities would fund the crediting rate and make up the shortfall in
contributions (see Gold (2001)).
Using a traditional approach to pension investing for DB plans, trustees might select a
simple 60% equity/40% long bond portfolio, and it is interesting to compare the funding
deficit or surplus at maturity under this strategy with the case where one of the hedg-
ing strategies is adopted. In Figure 1.15, we show the maturity hedging loss (or surplus)
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Figure 1.11: VRR for YTM crediting rate valuation under One-Factor HW, using spot
rate as the control variable, 10,000 simulations
following a traditional 60/40 equity/long bond strategy, alongside the accumulated matu-
rity hedging error using the two-factor HW hedge. Note that we have had to extend the
scale dramatically compared with the hedging graphs above. We have assumed the same
starting assets for each 5-year period (specifically, 1000V (t, 5)), although in practice this
is significantly more than a traditionally managed CB plan might hold.
This figure clearly demonstrates how the hedged portfolio targets the terminal liability,
while the unhedged portfolio may end up vastly over or under funded. On the other hand,
the unhedged case does generate some very enticing profits – but this is not a good case for
rejecting hedging, as the profits are unlikely to be repeated in the near future. The gains
from the equity/bond portfolio are largely generated from the steady period of declining
interest rates, which has generated consistent gains on long bonds that cannot continue
indefinitely, and indeed will reverse in periods of rising interest rates. There is a significant
possibility that the massive gains experienced in the last 10 years could be replaced by
equally large losses in the next 10 years using the equity/bond investment approach. If
the purpose of modern pension risk management is not to generate windfall gains, but to
minimize losses and hence minimize contribution variability as much as possible, then the
hedging strategy appears far more suitable.
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Spot Rate Valuation with One-Factor HW
Spot Rate Valuation with Two-Factor HW
Par Rate Valuation with One-Factor HW
Par Rate Valuation with Two-Factor HW
Figure 1.12: Compare Valuation Factors using 30-year spot and YTM crediting rates,
5-year horizon, initial fund $1000, 10,000 simulations.
1.9 Incorporating pre-retirement exits
In practice, employees may terminate their pension plan prior to the normal retirement date
for various reasons: change of employment, disability, death or early retirement. These
termination events are often assumed to be independent from the market performance.
Here we construct a simple example to illustrate that delta hedging remains effective if the
termination events are assumed to be independent from interest rates, and diversifiable.
Let U(t, T ) denote the valuation factor incorporating pre-retirement exits, and assuming
(for simplicity) that the individual will receive their account value at the end of the year
of exit.




+ bt+1c−tqxV (t, bt+ 1c) + bt+T−1c−tpxV (t, T )
where tpx is the probability that a plan member age x is still in the plan at age x+t, and qx
is the probability that a plan member age x exits the plan before age x+ 1 (Dickson et al.
(2013)). We see that U(t, T ) is simply a weighted average of V (t, S) where t ≤ S ≤ T . In
Figure 1.16 we show the surface of V (0, T ) for a range of horizon periods (T ) and start
dates. Although V (0, T ) is not a strictly increasing function in T it is generally increasing
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Delta Hedging, One-Factor HW
Delta-Gamma Hedging, One-Factor HW
Delta Hedging, Two-Factor HW
Figure 1.13: MHE for a CB plan with 5-year horizon, maturing at 2005-2015, initial amount
$1000, 30-year Treasury Bond YTM crediting rate, constant parameters.
for T ∈ [0, 20]. Using V (t, T ) as an approximation for U(t, T ) will tend to over-price and
over-hedge the risk.
When the exit events are diversifiable the plan can be hedged by combining the exit
probabilities with the appropriate hedge portfolios from Section 1.7.2. For a single cohort,
this could be constructed as follows.
• Step 1: At time 0, evaluate the valuation factor V (0, T ) and construct the hedging
portfolio based on the Greeks.
• Step 2: At the end of month 1, 100× 1/12px% of people remain in the plan (requires
V (1/12, T ) in liability), and 1/12qx percent of people leave the plan and will receive
the full account balance at the year end. We measure the hedge loss for the period
and re-construct the portfolio.
• Repeat Step 2 for t = [1/12, · · · , T ].
We illustrate this approach using demographic assumptions from the 2016 Actuarial
Report for University of Toronto Pension Plan (see Hewitt (2016) for the report and Pension
Experience Subcommittee (2014) for the mortality table), with a maximum horizon of 15
years. We set 1
12
qx as the aggregate 1-month exit probability for a member age x. The
probability that an employee will remain in the plan at the end of 15th year is approximately
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Delta Hedging, One-Factor HW
Delta-Gamma Hedging, One-Factor HW
Delta Hedging, Two-Factor HW
Figure 1.14: MHE for a CB plan with 5-year horizon, maturing at 2005-2015, initial amount
$1000, 30-year Treasury Bond YTM crediting rate, parameters recalibrated monthly.
47%. For a cohort starting on January 1st, 2000 and ending on December 31st 2014, the
maturity hedge error is 10.7% of the initial account value. To show how this hedge error
arises, in Figure 1.17 we show the monthly hedge errors that accumulate to the maturity
hedge error of 10.7% of F0 (which is set at $1000), with and without early exits. Notice
that the plan allowing for early exits has a slightly more stable hedging performance, but
the hedge errors at each re-balancing date are close. Therefore, introducing early exits
that are diversifiable will not affect the overall hedging results materially, and diversifiable
exits can easily be incorporated into the hedging strategy.
1.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied dynamic hedging strategies for Cash Balance Pension
plans. We have demonstrated that dynamic hedging strategies are relatively simple to
construct, and offer effective mitigation of the significant interest rate risk inherent in CB
plans with long Treasury bond YTM crediting rates.
We have restricted the examples, for example by excluding consideration of floors, by
limiting the horizon to only five years, and by limiting the hedging portfolio to simple
Treasury Bonds/STRIPs. Nevertheless, the results when applied to real world scenarios
do indicate that the simple delta strategy is able to provide a practical, affordable hedge
against interest rate risk, even through the turmoil of the past decade.
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Delta Hedging, One-Factor HW
Figure 1.15: Maturity Hedge Loss for 5-year CB plan maturing at 2005-2015, initial account
value F0 = 1000, 30 year Treasury spot crediting rate, traditional equity/bond investment


































Figure 1.16: V (0, T ) using 30 year Treasury Bond YTM crediting rate, with different
horizons and start dates, One-Factor HW model.
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hedge loss - with exit
hedge loss - without exit
Figure 1.17: Monthly Hedging Errors for a 15-year CB cohort starting on 1/1/2000, with
and without allowance for exits. One-Factor HW model, delta hedge, 30 year Treasury
Bond YTM crediting rates.
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Chapter 2
Early Exercise Defined Benefit
Underpin Plan
2.1 Introduction
The rising interest in hybrid pension plans suggests a potential for designing new risk-
sharing schemes. In this chapter, a new hybrid pension design is introduced. The intuition
behind the new plan is based on two existing embedded options: the Florida second-election
option, and the DB underpin.
The Florida second-election option is provided to public employees in Florida. The
state sponsors two different pension plans, a DC and a DB. Employees choose either plan
at enrollment. Subsequently, they have a one-time opportunity to transfer to the other
plan (from DB to DC, or vice versa), prior to their retirement. For an employee switching
from the DC to the DB plan, a “buy-in” cost would be calculated, equal to the accrued
benefit obligation of the DB plan, based on the employee’s current salary and service. The
buy-in cost is paid from the DC account balance; if this is insufficient, the employee must
cover any difference using his or her own financial resources.
The DB underpin plan is a DC plan that grants a DB type minimum guarantee. At
retirement, the retiree’s pension is the higher of the guaranteed DB benefit and the income
from the annuitized DC funds.
The new hybrid design introduced in this chapter provides natural links to both of these
plans. It is an early exercise DB underpin, under which a DC plan member may elect to
lock into the DB plan benefit at some point prior to retirement. This is equivalent to the
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Florida second election plan but with the transfer of funds at the switch from DC to DB
being limited to the DC account balance.
The new hybrid plan’s liability is evaluated using market consistent valuation methods
and we compare it with the Florida second election and the DB underpin options. This
chapter illustrates how the flexible nature of hybrid pension plans allows sponsors to design
new risk-sharing schemes based on their risk appetite and objectives. Moreover, we will
demonstrate that the creation of the new plan helps in conducting comprehensive and
direct comparisons between different existing plans.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the nota-
tion and assumptions. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 provide detailed background information for the
second-election option and the DB underpin option. Section 2.5 develops the new pension
plan, as well as presenting some theoretical results in discrete time. Section 2.6 extends
the work into the continuous time case and incorporates stochastic salaries. Section 2.7
displays the numerical results. Section 2.8 illustrates an alternative new pension design.
Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Notation and Assumptions
In this section we introduce the actuarial and economical notation and assumptions adopted
throughout this chapter. As is usual in the financial literature, we assume a complete and
arbitrage-free market, with all rational agents sharing the same information generated by
a filtration. This chapter focuses on the investment risks prior to the retirement date, thus
we ignore mortality and other demographic considerations.
c denotes the annual contribution rate (as a constant proportion of salary) into the
DC plan. We assume that contributions are paid annually. We also assume that all
contributions are paid by the plan sponsor/employer, although this is easily relaxed
to allow for employee contributions.
b denotes the accrual rate in the DB plan, which is assumed to be a constant.
T denotes the time of retirement of the employee, which is assumed to be known and
non-random.
r denotes the risk-free rate of interest, compounded continuously, which is assumed to
be a constant.
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ä(T ) denotes the actuarial value at retirement of a pension of 1 per year. Since we ignore
longevity changes, and we assume a constant interest rate, we implicitly assume ä(T )
is a constant.
St denotes the stochastic price index process of the funds in the DC account. We assume





S (t), S0 > 0
where ZQS (t) is a standard Brownian Motion under the risk neutral measure Q.
Lt denotes the salary from t to t + 1 for t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1, where t denotes years of
service. We first assume that salaries increase deterministically at a rate µL per year,
continuously compounded, so that
Lt = L0e
tµL
We will also consider a stochastic salary process in the continuous setting, which we





L (t), L0 > 0
dZQL (t)dZ
Q
S (t) = ρdt
where ZQL (t) is a standard Brownian Motion under the risk neutral measure Q and
ρ is the correlation coefficient between ZQL and Z
Q
S (correlation between the stock
market and the salary increase).




L (t), t ≥ 0
}
when the
salary is stochastic, or
{
ZQS (t), t ≥ 0
}
when the salary is deterministic. For condi-
tional expectations with respect to the filtration, we simplify the notation such that
EQt [·] = EQ[·|Ft].
2.3 DB Underpin Plan
The DB Underpin pension plan, also known as the floor-offset plan in the USA, provides
a guaranteed defined benefit minimum which underpins a DC plan. Plan sponsors make
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regular specified contributions into the member’s DC account, and separately contribute
to an additional fund which covers the extra cost of the guarantee. Employees usually
have limited investment options to make the guarantee value more predictable. At the
retirement date, after T years of service, if the member’s DC balance is higher than the
value of the guaranteed minimum defined benefit pension, the plan sponsor will not incur
any extra cost. However, if the DC benefit is smaller, the plan sponsor will cover the
difference.
Using arbitrage-free pricing, we can calculate the present value of the cumulative cost
of the DB underpin plan for the pension sponsor at time t = 0 as follows. We assume
(more for clarity than necessity) that DB benefits are based on the final 1-year’s salary,























Value of DB underpin option
The option value does not have an explicit solution, but can be determined using Monte
Carlo simulation. See Chen and Hardy (2009) for details on the valuation and funding of
the DB underpin option.
Notice that we have formulated the problem from the sponsor’s perspective. In fact,
under a risk neutral valuation, the cost function is equal to the expected discounted benefit
received by the employee. For other pension plans studied in this chapter, we will stay
with this approach, to be consistent with the pension literature (including, for example,
Hardy et al. (2014), Bacinello (2000), Chen and Hardy (2009), Guillén et al. (2006), etc.).
2.4 Florida Second Election (FSE) Option
Public employees of the State of Florida are given the choice to participate in either the DC
or the DB plan at the beginning of their employment. In addition, employees are granted
a one-time option to switch to the other plan anytime before their retirement date. This
option is called the second election by the Florida Retirement System. In this chapter,
we focus on the option to exchange the DC plan for the DB plan, based on the life cycle
hypothesis that individuals prefer portability at younger ages (provided by the DC plan)
and stable retirement income at older ages (provided by the DB plan). To exercise the
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second election option, there is a “buy in” cost equal to the accrued benefit obligation
(ABO), which is calculated as the present value of the accrued benefit, based on the
current service and the current pensionable salary (ABO = accrual rate× current salary×
number of years in service× annuity factor× discount factor).
We denote the ABO of the DB benefit for an employee with t years of service by Kt,
so that
Kt = b Lt−1 t ä(T ) e
−r(T−t)
Let τ denote a stopping time with respect to F , which represents the time that an
employee chooses to switch from the DC plan to the DB plan. If the ABO at τ is more
than the DC account balance, the employee needs to fund the difference from her own
financial resources. If the DC account is more than the ABO at transition, then the
employee retains the difference in a separate DC top-up account which can be withdrawn
at retirement.
Mathematically, assuming that the employee exercises the option at the time which
provides most financial benefit, the present value of the total DC and DB benefit cost at








−rτ (KT e−r(T−τ) −Kτ)]
where the first term, as in the previous section, is the present value of the DC contributions,
and the second term is the additional funding required for the DB benefit, offset by the
ABO at transition, which is funded from the DC contributions. The ‘sup’ indicates that
the valuation assumes the switch from DC to DB is made at the time to maximize the
cost to the employer, which is indeed equivalent to maximizing the expected value of the


















Milevsky and Promislow (2004) studied the price and optimal switching time of the
Florida option with deterministic assumptions.
39
2.5 Early Exercise DB underpin plan - Discrete Case
The FSE design has the advantage that it provides employees with the flexibility to choose
their plan type based on their changing risk appetite. However, employees retain the
investment risk through the DC period of membership, and also have the additional risk of
a suboptimal choice of switching time. Moreover, when the DC investment falls below the
ABO of the DB plan, the employee may be unable to switch, if they do not have sufficient
assets to make up the difference.
Inspired by the idea of combining the DB underpin plan with the Florida option, we
investigate a new hybrid design, which we call the Early Exercise DB underpin, that adds
a guarantee at the time of the switch from DC to DB. If the employee’s DC account is
below the ABO when s/he elects to switch, then the plan sponsor will cover the difference.
2.5.1 Problem Formulation
We assume that the contributions are made annually into the DC account until the em-
ployee switches to DB, and that we are valuing the benefits at t. We assume also that the
employee has not switched from DC to DB before time t, that the DC account is wt at t,
and that future account values (up to the switching time) follow the process








cLu τ = 1, 2, ..., T − t.
We assume that the salary is deterministic, though we will relax this assumption when
we consider the continuous case in the next section.
We assume that the exercise dates are at the beginning of each year (or at the end of
year T), before the contribution is made into the DC account, so the admissible exercise
dates are τ = 0, 1, · · ·T − t.
The present value at time t of the cost of future benefits (past and future service, DC
and DB), which is denoted by C1(t, wt), can be expressed as the sum of three terms:
1. The present value of the future contributions into the DC account before the member
switches to the DB plan.
2. The present value of the cost of the DB benefit, offset by the ABO at the time of the
switch.
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3. The difference between the ABO and the DC balance at the switching time, if posi-
tive.
We take the maximum value of the sum of these three parts, maximizing over all the
possible switching dates, as follows.






−rτ (KT e−r(T−t−τ) −Kt+τ)+ e−rτ (Kt+τ −W t,wt+τ)+ ]
Notice that the switching time τ is involved in all three parts, which makes the analysis
more complex. We may rewrite the problem using optional sampling theorem, such that












which means the sponsor’s cost to fund a DC plan up to a future time τ1, is equivalent to the
risk neutral expectation of the present value of the DC account balance at τ1. Therefore,
our cost function becomes:















































e−rτ (Wτ+t −Kt+τ )+
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price of the Option
−w (2.1)
This new formulation can be interpreted as the expected value of the future discounted
benefit, which also consists of three terms:
• The present value of the DB plan benefits at time t.
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• A Bermudan type call option, with underlying process Wt and strike value Kt.
• The negative of the funds available, w from the existing DC balance at t.
The first and third terms do not affect the switching time. To study the optimal exercise
strategy, we may omit the first and third terms and define our value function as



















− b(t+ τ)ä(T )Lτ+t−1e−r(T−τ−t)
)+ 
At time t, given that the DC account balance is w, we define the intrinsic value of the
option, denoted ve1(t, w), as the value if the member decides to switch at that date, and




w − tbLt−1ä(T )e−r(T−t)
)+
(2.3)









The option is not analytically tractable. In the next section, we present some of the
properties of the value function, which will enable us to use numerical solution methods.
2.5.2 The Exercise Frontier
The following proposition gives the general convexity and monotonicity of the value func-
tion
Proposition 1. At each observation date 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the value function v1(t, w) is a
strictly positive, non-decreasing, continuous and convex function of w.
Proof. It is trivial to observe that v1(t, w) is strictly positive since (W
t,w
t+τ − Kt+τ )+ ≥ 0
with the inequality sign being strict with a non-zero probability. We only need to show
that the value function is non-decreasing, continuous and convex in w.
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• Non-decreasing in w For ε > 0, we have (w − k)+ − (w + ε− k)+ ≤ 0, therefore,








)+ − (W t,wt+τ + εSt+τSt −Kt+τ
)+}]
≤ 0
where the last inequality is based on the fact that St+τ
St
is strictly positive a.s.. Simi-
larly we can show that vh1 is non-decreasing in w:

















and immediately we see that ve1 is non-decreasing in w as well.
• Continuity in w : For any ε > 0, using the fact that (w + ε− k)+ − (w − k)+ ≤ ε,
we have







































Thus, v1 is Lipschitz continuous in w and by non-decreasing property, we have
v1(t, w + ε) ≤ v1(t, w) + ε. The similar property for vh1 follows immediately:






















= vh1 (t, w) + ε
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In addition, we observe that we1 is Lipschitz continuous in w.
• Convexity in w: We follow Ben-Ameur et al. (2002), and prove the convexity by
induction. For any w1 > 0 and w2 > 0, and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1






(λw1 + (1− λ)w2 + cLT−1)
ST
ST−1
− bLT−1T ä(T )
)+]
≤ λvh1 (T − 1, w1) + (1− λ)vh1 (T − 1, w2)
Thus, vh1 is convex at time T-1, and similarly v
e
1 is convex at time T − 1. Since
v1(T − 1, w) = max
(
ve1(T − 1, w), vh1 (T − 1, w)
)
v1 is also convex at time T − 1.
We now assume that result holds for time t + 1, where 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2, then the
continuation value at time t is









































= λvh1 (t, w1) + (1− λ)vh1 (t, w2)
Thus, vh1 is a convex function at time t. Since v
e







holds for all t, then v1(t, w) is convex function at time t.
Then, by induction, we have proved the convexity of v1(t, w).
Like other Bermudan and American-type options, there exists a continuation region
C and a stopping region (or exercising region) D. When the time and DC account value
pair, (t, w), is in the continuation region, it is optimal for the member to stay in the DC
plan. When (t, w) is in the stopping region, it is optimal for the member to switch to the
DB plan. The option to switch is exercised when (t, w) moves into the stopping region.
Mathematically, the continuation and stopping regions are defined as
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• vh1 (t, w) > ve1(t, w)⇔ (t, w) ∈ C
• vh1 (t, w) ≤ ve1(t, w)⇔ (t, w) ∈ D
Proposition 2. There exists a function ϕ(t) such that
v1(t, w) =
{
ve1(t, w) if w ≥ ϕ(t)
vh1 (t, w) if w < ϕ(t)
Proof. Consider first the case when w < Kt at time t. We have v
e
1(t, w) = (w −Kt)+, so
w < Kt ⇒ ve1(t, w) = 0
Then immediately we have vh1 (t, w) > 0 = v
e
1(t, w). Thus if w ∈ [0, Kt], it cannot be
optimal to exercise. Therefore, in order to explore the exercise frontier, we need only
consider cases when w > Kt.
When w > Kt we have v
e
1(t, w) = w −Kt and
(t, w) ∈ D =⇒ v1(t, w) = ve1(t, w) =⇒ v1(t, w) = w −Kt
First, assume that (t, w) ∈ D, then by the continuity of vh1 and ve1 in w, we have
(t, w) ∈ D =⇒ ve(t, w) ≥ vh(t, w)
=⇒ ∀ε > 0 ve(t, w + ε) = ve(t, w) + ε ≥ vh(t, w) + ε ≥ vh(t, w + ε)
=⇒ (t, w + h) ∈ D
Next, assume that (t, w) ∈ C. Note that vh1 (t, w) + ε ≥ vh1 (t, w + ε) for all ε > 0 implies
that vh1 (t, w − ε) ≥ vh1 (t, w)− ε
(t, w) ∈ C =⇒ vh1 (t, w) > ve1(t, w)
=⇒ ∀ε > 0 vh1 (t, w − ε) ≥ vh1 (t, w)− ε > ve1(t, w)− ε = ve1(t, w − ε)
=⇒ (t, w − ε) ∈ C
These results show that it is optimal for the employee to switch to the DB plan only when
his/her DC account balance is above a certain threshold (ϕ(t)) at each possible switching
time.
The function ϕ(t) is often known as the exercise boundary that separates the contin-
uation and exercise regions. Notice that it is possible, under certain parameters, that
ϕ(t) = ∞ for some t < T , which means that it is not optimal to switch regardless of the
DC account value. The next proposition will specify the situations in which ϕ(t) <∞.
45
Proposition 3. The behavior of the exercise boundary ϕ(t) depends on the ratio
c









≥ 1, there exists a t∗ ∈ [0, 1, · · · , T − 1], such that ϕ(t) = ∞,∀t ≤ t∗,
and ϕ(t) <∞,∀t > t∗.
(iii). The value of t∗ is bt′c, where b·c represents the floor function, and t′ satisfies
(t′ + 1)bLt′ ä(T )e
−r(T−t′) − t′bLt′−1ä(T )e−r(T−t
′) − cLt′ = 0.






e−r then t∗ = T − 1, which means ϕ(t) = ∞,




= 1, then t∗ = 0.
Proof. First, notice that if ϕ(t) <∞, then for sufficiently large w
v1(t, w) = v
e



































d2,t,w = d1,t,w − σS
which is the Black-Scholes Formula, with initial stock price w + cLt and strike value
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(t+1)bLtä(T )e































−r(T−t)N(−d2,t,w)− (w + cLt)N (−d1,t,w)
)
− cLt + (t+ 1)bLtä(T )e−r(T−t) − tbLt−1ä(T )e−r(T−t)
= (t+ 1)bLtä(T )e
−r(T−t) − tbLt−1ä(T )e−r(T−t) − cLt




< 1, we prove ϕ(t) <∞,∀t ∈ [0, T ] by induction.
At time T, ϕ(T ) = TbLT−1ä(T ) <∞.
At time t, assume ϕ(t + 1) <∞. We observe that for sufficiently large w <∞, we have
v1(t+ 1, w) = v
e
1(t+ 1, w). Next, we can show
lim
w→∞





























The last line is due to the fact that if w ≥ ϕ(t+ 1)
v1 (t+ 1, w)− ve1 (t+ 1, w) = 0 < ϕ(t+ 1) <∞
and for w < ϕ(t+ 1)
v1 (t+ 1, w)− ve1 (t+ 1, w) ≤ ve1 (t+ 1, ϕ(t+ 1)) ≤ ϕ(t+ 1) <∞
since v1(t + 1, w) is an increasing function of w. Thus, the difference is bounded by
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ϕ(t+ 1) <∞ and we are able to apply the Dominated Convergence Theorem. Next,
lim
w→∞












= (t+ 1)bLtä(T )e
−r(T−t) − tbä(T )e−r(T−t)Lt−1 − cLt
> (t+ 1)bLtä(T )e
−r(T−t) − tbä(T )e−r(T−t)Lt−1 − Ltbä(T )e−rT
> (t+ 1)bLtä(T )e
−r(T−t) − tbä(T )e−r(T−t)Lt − Ltbä(T )e−r(T−t)
= 0
Which implies ϕ(t) <∞ (otherwise if ϕ(t) =∞, limw→∞ ve1(t, w)− vh1 (t, w) ≤ 0).




≥ 1, we split the proof into three parts.
(1) If c
bä(T )e−rT
> 1, we first prove that there exists a t∗ such that ϕ(t) = ∞,∀t ≤ t∗,
then prove that ϕ(t) <∞, ∀t > t∗ by induction from time T to t∗ + 1 as above.
We have f(0) < 0 so that
lim
w→∞
ve1(0, w)− vh1 (0, w) ≤ f(0) < 0
and thus ϕ(0) =∞. Also, notice we can write f(t) in the form
f(t) = eµLt
(
te−r(T−t)bä(T )(1− e−µL) + bä(T )e−r(T−t) − c
)
= eµLth(t)
where h(t) is a strictly increasing function of time t, if both r and µL are non-negative,



















> 0 by assumption.
Then, we can find t′ such that
f(t) < 0 for t < t′
f(t) = 0 for t = t′
f(t) > 0 for t > t′
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Here we set t∗ = bt′c, and we have
lim
w→∞
ve1(t, w)− vh1 (t, w) ≤ f(t) < 0,∀t < t∗
and for t = t∗, first notice that
f(t∗) ≤ 0 =⇒ c ≥ bä(T )e−rT
(
t∗ + 1− t∗e−µL
)
ert∗
Next, for any finite w > t∗Lt∗−1bä(T )e
−r(T−t∗), we have

































0, w − t∗Lt∗−1bä(T )e−rT ert∗
)
= ve1(t∗, w)























0, w + cLt∗ − (t∗ + 1)Ltbä(T )e−r(T−t∗)
)
Thus, we have vh1 (t∗, w) > v
e
1(t∗, w),∀w <∞, and
lim
t→∞
ve1(t∗, w)− vh1 (t∗, w) ≤ f(t∗) ≤ 0
which implies ϕ(t∗) =∞.
Repeating the induction:
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At time T, again we have ϕ(T ) <∞.
At time t > t∗, assume ϕ(t+ 1) <∞.
lim
w→∞
ve1(t, w)− vh1 (t, w) = f(t) > 0, t > t∗
Thus ϕ(t) <∞,∀t > t∗.
(2) If c > bä(T ) ((1− e−µL)T + e−µL) e−r
c > bä(T )e−r
(
T − (T − 1)e−µL
)
> bä(T )e−r ≥ bä(T )e−rT
Thus, we know there exists t∗ as defined previously, and for time T − 1,
lim
w→∞
ve1(T − 1, w)− vh1 (T − 1, w)
= TbLT−1ä(T )e
−r − (T − 1)bLT−2ä(T )e−r − cLT−1
< TbLT−1ä(T )e












= 1, we have f(0) = 0. Thus t∗ = t
′ = 0, immediately we have
ϕ(0) =∞.
This proposition demonstrates that the ratio between the DC contribution rate and the
accrual rate of the DB benefit will determine the shape of the exercise boundary. In the
extreme case, when the DC contribution rate is much higher than the DB accrual rate, it
is optimal for the employee to wait until the retirement date, and the Early Exercise DB
underpin option simplifies to the DB underpin option.
2.6 Early Exercise DB underpin plan - Continuous
Case
By extending the current model to incorporate a stochastic salary process, solving the
value of the option becomes a three dimensional problem. The optimal exercise boundary
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will depend on both the salary and the DC account balance. In this section, we reconstruct
the problem in a continuous setting, with a stochastic salary.
The mathematical formulation replaces the summation sign with the integral sign, and
extends the admissible stopping time set to [t, T ]. By the Optional Sampling Theorem, we
can define the value function similarly to the discrete case.




e−rτ (Wt+τ −Kt+τ )+
∣∣∣∣Wt = w,Lt = l]
where
dWt =(rWt + cLt)dt+ σSWtdZ
Q
S (t), W0 = 0
dLt =rLtdt+ σLLtdZ
Q
L (t), L0 > 0
Kt =b t ä(T )Lt e
−r(T−t)
Notice now that the value function also depends on the salary at time t. In the following
sections we show that the dimensionality of the problem can be reduced to two, in the
sense that the value function only depends on the wealth-salary ratio process.
2.6.1 Definition of the Value Function
We define a new variable Yt =
Wt
Lt
, which represents the DC wealth-salary ratio. Then we
can rewrite our value function:
























































































as a two-dimensional standard Brownian motion under P̃ . It is straightforward to show
that under the new probability measure P̃ , the wealth-salary ratio has the following SDE:
dYt = cdt+ YtσY dZ
P̃





L − 2σSσLρ and Z P̃Y (t) is a standard Brownian Motion under the
measure P̃ . We can define a new function (2-dimensional):




Y t,yt+τ − b(t+ τ)ä(T )e−(T−t−τ)r
)+]
Thus, v2(t, w/l) = v2(t, w, l)/l, which clearly suggests that the exercise rule depends on
the wealth-to-salary ratio.
2.6.2 Properties of the Value Function and Exercise Frontier
Proposition 4. The value function v2(t, y) is a strictly positive, non-decreasing, continu-
ous and convex function of y, and a continuous and non-increasing function of time t.
Proof. The strict positive property is trivial to see, and we refer Touzi (2013) for the proofs
of other properties:
• Non-decreasing in y: By writing the value function explicitly












du− b(t+ τ)ä(T )e−(T−t−τ)r
)+]
we immediately see that y → v2(t, y) is an increasing and convex function on [0,∞).
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• Continuity in y: For x > y




Y t,xt+τ − b(t+ τ)ä(T )e−(T−t−τ)r































• Non-increasing in t: Since Y t1,yt1+t
law
= Y t2,yt2+t, and the strike functionGt = tbe
−(T−t)rä(T )
is an increasing function of time t, immediately we have v2(t, y) is non-increasing in
t.
• Continuity in t: For t2 > t1,
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|v2(t1, y)− v2(t2, y)| ≤
∣∣∣v2(t1, y)− EP̃t1 [v2(t2, Y t1,yt2 )]∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣EP̃t1 [v2(t2, Y t1,yt2 )]− v2(t2, y)∣∣∣
≤ C1
√
t2 − t1 + EP̃t1
[∣∣v2(t2, Y t1,yt2 )− v2(t2, y)∣∣]
≤ C1
√
t2 − t1 + C2EP̃t1




where the third line follows from the Lipschitz continuity of the value function in y.
Thus, we have proved that the value function is Hölder-Continuous in t.
As above, we denote the continuation region C = {(t, y) ∈ (0, T )× [0,∞) : v2(t, y) > ve2(t, y)}
and stopping region D = {(t, y) ∈ (0, T )× [0,∞) : v2(t, y) = ve2(t, y)}, and let ϕ(t) be the
exercise frontier which separates the two regions.
Proposition 5. There exists a function ϕ(t) such that
v2(t, y) =
{
ve2(t, y) if y ≥ ϕ(t)
vh2 (t, y) if y < ϕ(t)
Proof. Denote the continuation region C = {(t, y) ∈ (0, T )× [0,∞) : v2(t, y) > ve2(t, y)}
and stopping regions C = {(t, y) ∈ (0, T )× [0,∞) : v2(t, y) = ve2(t, y)}. Then, by standard
arguments based on the strong Markov Property (see Peskir and Shiryaev (2006) Corollary
2.9), the first hitting time τD = inf {0 ≤ s ≤ T − t : (t+ s, Yt+s) ∈ D} is optimal, and the
value function is C1,2 on C and satisfies:
∂v2
∂t
+ LY v2 = 0 in C
where LY is the infinitesimal generator.
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If (t, y) ∈ D,
v2(t, y + h) ≤ v2(t, y) + h = ve2(t, y) + h = ve2(t, y + h)
thus (t, y + h) ∈ D.
If (t, y) ∈ C,
if y − h > Gt, v2(t, y − h) ≥ v2(t, y)− h > ve2(t, y)− h = ve2(t, y − h)
if y − h < Gt, v2(t, y − h) > 0 = ve2(t, y − h), thus (t, y − h) ∈ C












= 0 in C
v2(t, y) = v
e
2(t, y) in D
v2(t, y) > v
e
2(t, y) in C
v2(t, y) = v
e
2(t, y) for y = ϕ(t) or t = T













= bä(T )e−r(T−t) + rbtä(T )e−r(T−t) − c
If f(t) < 0, then there is a contradiction with the variational inequality, which means
v2(t, y) 6= g(t, y) for all y, and thus (t, y) ∈ C,∀y (ϕ(t) =∞). Since f(t) is an increasing
function of t, there exists a t∗ satisfying f(t∗) = 0. If t∗ ∈ [0, T ], then (t, y) ∈ C,∀(t, y) ∈
[0, t∗]×R. In particular, if c > bä(T )(1 + rT ) (when the DC contribution rate is extremely
high or the horizon is short), the option is equivalent to a European Option.
Figure 2.1 shows an example of the optimal exercise boundary. As mentioned before,
the member should switch to the DB plan only when they have already saved a certain
extra amount over the cost of ABO, and in this graph, this excess amount is relatively
stable. When the time comes very close to the retirement date, the plan member is facing
less future opportunity to obtain a higher DC account balance from the equity market, and
thus is willing to make the transfer to the DB plan even with lower DC balance, in order to
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secure their benefit. In this example, the decrease of the optimal exercise boundary starts
only at the last few month, and eventually converges to the value of the DB plan.
























ABO to Salary Ratio
Optimal Exercising Boundary






Figure 2.1: Example of Optimal Exercising Boundary, r = 0.06, σS = 0.15, σL = 0.04,
c = 0.16, b = 0.016 and ä(T ) = 14.75
2.6.3 Different Discount Rates for ABO Calculation
In practice, actuaries often use a discount rate higher than the observed market risk-free
rate to determine the ABO. Here we denote by γ the discount rate for the ABO calculation,
so the ABO has the following form:
Kt = tbLtä(T )e
−γ(T−t)
It is not difficult to show that the new cost function can be expressed in the same form
as equation (2.1) through the Optional Sampling Theorem. Under our stochastic salary
assumption, however, the risk-free rate r only appears in the ABO calculations, which
means that γ and r are mathematically indistinguishable. Thus, we only include γ in
our study of deterministic salary assumptions. The new value function preserves similar
properties (with slight modifications) as those stated in Propositions (1), (2), (3) for the
discrete case, and (4) and (5) in the continuous case. Notice that using different discount
rates for the ABO does not violate our market-consistent valuation principle. Here we use
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v4 to denote the price with γ as discount rate for the ABO:






Wt+τ − b(t+ τ)Lt+τ ä(T )e−γ(T−t−τ)
)+]
2.7 Numerical Examples
In this section we present numerical results for the values of the Early Exercise DB Underpin
plan. For the continuous setting, we use the penalty method (see Forsyth and Vetzal (2002))
and for the discrete case, we use the Least Square Method (see Longstaff and Schwartz
(2001)). We compare the Early Exercise option with the DB underpin and with the Florida
Second Election option. For the DB underpin option, to be consistent with the valuation
method for the Early Exercise DB underpin option, we use Monte Carlo simulation in the
discrete setting and the Crank Nicolson finite difference method in the continuous setting.
For the second election option, we are able to derive explicit solutions under both the
discrete and continuous settings (see Appendix B.1). Furthermore, we include the Early
Exercise option with deterministic salary in the continuous setting (denoted by v3) as an
intermediate comparison with the discrete case.
2.7.1 Benchmark Scenario
The initial benchmark parameter set is as follows. Later we perform some sensitivity tests
on each of the parameters.
• µL = r = 0.04. We set µL to be the same as the risk-free rate, to make a consistent
comparison with the stochastic salary assumption (when the salary is assumed to be
hedgeable).
• ρ = 0, assumes no correlation between salary and investment return.
• σS = 0.15, σL = 0.04, b = 0.016, c = 0.125 and ä(T ) = 14.75.
• L0 = 1, t = 0, so that all values are given per unit of starting salary.
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2.7.2 Cost
Table 2.1 shows the value of each pension plan in the continuous setting. The prices for
the Early Exercise DB-Underpin (EEDBU), the Florida Second Election (FSE) and the
DB underpin plans are expressed as an additional cost on top of the base DB plan. We
show values for the Early Exercise DB with stochastic salaries v2, and with deterministic
salaries, v3. Table 2.2 shows the results in the discrete setting.
Time to Retirement DB DC FSE DBU EEDBU(s) EEDBU(d)
T v2 v3
10yr 2.36 1.25 0 0.0023 0.0070 0.0062
15yr 3.54 1.87 0 0.0126 0.0354 0.0315
20yr 4.72 2.50 0.0203 0.0348 0.1010 0.0936
30yr 7.08 3.75 0.2179 0.1199 0.3492 0.3355
40yr 9.44 5.00 0.5837 0.2594 0.7380 0.7194
Table 2.1: Cost of each pension plan per unit of starting salary, continuous setting. Hybrid
costs are additional to the basic DB cost. FSE is the Florida second election option; DBU
is the DB Underpin, EEDBU(s) v2 is the Early Exercise DB underpin with stochastic
salaries, and EEDBU(d) v3 is the Early Exercise DB underpin with deterministic salaries.
Time to Retirement DB DC FSE DBU EEDBU(d)
T v1
10yr 2.2675 1.2500 0 0.0039 (0.0011) 0.0099 (0.0001)
15yr 3.4012 1.8750 0 0.0210 (0.0020) 0.0456 (0.0003)
20yr 4.5349 2.5000 0.0304 0.0458 (0.0029) 0.1190 (0.0006)
30yr 6.8024 3.7500 0.2476 0.1455 (0.0048) 0.3752 (0.0014)
40yr 9.0699 5.0000 0.6280 0.3115 (0.0069) 0.7726 (0.0025)
Table 2.2: Cost of each pension plan, discrete setting. Hybrid costs are additional to the
basic DB cost. FSE is the Florida second election option; DBU is the DB Underpin, and
EEDBU(d) v1 is the Early Exercise DB underpin (with deterministic salaries).
Some observations can be made:
• EEDBU v2 is greater than EEDBU v3 which reflects the additional costs from stochas-
tic salaries, but the results are fairly close. We would expect to observe a similar
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result in discrete-time case, such that a stochastic salary would lead to a higher but
close cost as in the deterministic salary assumption.
• When the expected retirement date is near, under the benchmark parameters, par-
ticipants in the Second Election plan should always be in the DB plan (t∗ = 0), so
there will be no extra cost required to fund the second election option.
• Although the Early Exercise DB underpin option is greater than both the DB un-
derpin and the Second Election, none of the values in the benchmark scenario exceed
10% of the cost of a DB plan. For horizons of 30 years or less, the extra cost from
the EEDBU option costs around 5% more than the basic DB plan.
• As T increases, the cost is increasing, at an increasing rate, for all three options.
The underpin and election options become significantly more costly over 40 years
compared with the cost for 30 years.
• In the discrete-time case, the values of the options are generally greater than in
the continuous case, and we would expect a larger difference if stochastic salary is
incorporated. However, the observations made in the continuous case also apply in
the discrete case.
2.7.3 Sensitivity Tests
In this section, we present the sensitivity tests over all parameters in the continuous setting.
We consider c, µL, r, σS, γ and b under the deterministic salary assumption and σL and
ρ under the stochastic salary assumption. We also fix the time horizon to be 30 years.
Details are displayed in Table 2.3.
We note the following points.
• All three plans share the same directional trends as the parameters change, but with
some very different sensitivities.
• The additional costs of the hybrid plans react in the opposite direction to the under-
lying DB costs, for parameters which influence the DB cost. For example, increasing
the risk-free rate r decreases the DB cost, but increases the additional hybrid costs.
Increasing the accrual rate b increases the DB costs, but decreases the additional
hybrid costs. Hence, the sensitivity of the total costs to the changing parameters is
rather more muted than the sensitivity of the additional costs shown in the table.
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Factor Sensitivity Tests
r 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
DB 23.5064 17.414 12.9006 9.557 7.08 5.245 3.8856 2.8785 2.1325
vse 0 0 0 0.0598 0.2179 0.4045 0.5786 0.7213 0.8276
v3 0.0174 0.0437 0.1018 0.2023 0.3355 0.451 0.6202 0.7398 0.8327
vU 0.0093 0.0198 0.039 0.0711 0.1199 0.1878 0.2741 0.374 0.4797
µL 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
DB 2.1325 2.8785 3.8856 5.245 7.08 9.557 12.9006 17.414 23.5064
vse 0.3448 0.2987 0.265 0.2389 0.2179 0.2005 0.1858 0.1732 0.1623
v3 0.5299 0.473 0.4217 0.3758 0.3355 0.3004 0.2703 0.2446 0.2229
vU 0.4797 0.374 0.2741 0.1878 0.1199 0.0711 0.039 0.0198 0.0093
c 0.085 0.095 0.105 0.115 0.125 0.135 0.145 0.155 0.165
vse 0.0163 0.0466 0.0909 0.1484 0.2179 0.2987 0.3902 0.4917 0.6026
v3 0.0759 0.1235 0.1831 0.2539 0.3355 0.4271 0.5282 0.6383 0.757
vU 0.0183 0.0325 0.0533 0.0821 0.1199 0.1679 0.2269 0.2975 0.3801
σS 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.23
v3 0.2205 0.2314 0.2542 0.2893 0.3355 0.391 0.4538 0.5225 0.5954
vU 0.0012 0.0094 0.0311 0.0685 0.1199 0.183 0.2552 0.3341 0.418
b 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.02
DB 5.31 5.7525 6.195 6.6375 7.08 7.5225 7.965 8.4075 8.85
vse 0.4665 0.3896 0.3235 0.2667 0.2179 0.17 0.1401 0.1096 0.0838
v3 0.5826 0.5075 0.4422 0.3853 0.3355 0.2918 0.2535 0.2199 0.1904
vU 0.2958 0.2342 0.1864 0.1491 0.1199 0.0969 0.0788 0.0643 0.0527
γ 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
vse 0 0 0 0.067 0.2179 0.3792 0.5281 0.6591 0.7728
v3 0.1315 0.1492 0.1835 0.2442 0.3355 0.4513 0.5811 0.715 0.8463
Table 2.3: Sensitivity tests over (c, µL, r, σS, γ and b), using deterministic salaries. v
se




σL 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09
v3 0.3363 0.3389 0.3432 0.3492 0.357 0.3665 0.3778 0.391 0.4058
vU 0.1209 0.1238 0.1286 0.1354 0.1443 0.1551 0.1681 0.183 0.2001
ρ -1 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 0 0.1 0.5 0.9 1
v3 0.4538 0.4434 0.4015 0.3596 0.3492 0.3389 0.298 0.2623 0.2542
vU 0.2552 0.2432 0.195 0.1472 0.1354 0.1238 0.079 0.0396 0.0311
Table 2.4: Sensitivity tests over (σL and ρ), stochastic salaries.
• The risk-free rate has a significant impact on the Early Exercise DB underpin option
value, especially on the relative cost with respect to the DB plan. However, as shown
by the sensitivity test on γ, the impact mostly comes from the value of the ABO.
Also, it is interesting to note that when r is high, the cost of the FSE option is quite
close to the Early Exercise DB underpin option.
• Decreases in the accrual rate b for the DB plan increase the relative value of the
Early Exercise DB option. The extra cost reflects the fact that the funding of the
DC plan is higher than the DB plan. When b is high, the fast accumulation of the
DB benefit would discourage employees from entering into the DC account, and the
option value will be reduced.
• In our model, the cost of the second election option is independent of the market
volatility σS.
Although the structure of the Early Exercise DB underpin plan provides more flexibility
and protection to the employee than both the second election option and the DB underpin
plan, the additional cost does not appear as large as one may expect. In most scenarios,
the cost is less than 5% of the DB plan. The relative cost is high when the risk-free rate
increases, however, it is interesting to note that the cost is very close to the second election
option. Similarly, when the salary growth rate is low, the cost is quite close to that of
the DB underpin option. This demonstrates that a very large cost comes either from the
option which allows employees to switch to DC, or from the guarantee.
Table 2.4 displays the sensitivity test for the stochastic salary parameters. The risks
involved in the stochastic salary process have less impact overall. Larger volatility in the
salary process, as well as negative correlation between the salary and equity market, will
increase the volatility of the wealth-salary ratio process and thus increase the option value.
These two risks have same effect on the DB underpin option, which has been previously
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observed by Chen and Hardy (2009). However, under our assumptions, the value of the
second election option is immunized to these two risks.
2.8 DB trade-in with DC
One weakness in the design of the Early Exercise type DB underpin plan is that the
employer is indeed bearing more risks than a traditional DB plan. Here we illustrate an
example of how to modify the Early Exercise DB underpin plan to retain the employees’
flexibility in choosing between DB and DC plans, while restraining the sponsor’s cost.
Instead of allowing the employees to retain any excess amount in the DC plan at the time
of switching from DC to DB, the new plan will force the employee to forfeit all his/her DC
account balance. Mathematically, the cost function at time t for this new plan at time t is















Cost of DB plan less DC balance

Clearly, if the employee has a DC balance higher than their accrued benefit obligation
under the DB plan, there is no incentive for the employee to make the change. Here we
define Ctrade(t, w, τ) as the cost of the DB trade-in DC option given the stopping time τ :

















Denote τT as the “waiting untill the end” strategy such that the employee only exercises
the option on the retirement date if his/her DC account balance is lower than the fair value
of the DB plan, otherwise they will retire with their DC plan. Then, for any admissible
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optimal stopping time τ , we have












































































Therefore, the cost of this new plan is equivalent to the cost of sponsoring a DB under-
pin plan (discrete case can be derived similarly). In practice, employees may choose to
switch to a DB plan with cost higher than its “fair value”; possible reasons include their
risk-averse behavior, the difficulty to obtain a “fairly” priced annuity in the insurance
market, asymmetric information, etc. The new plan discussed in this section is another
natural extension of the second election option and the DB underpin plan, and we hope
our discussion will inspire more hybrid designs for the pension market.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we combine Florida’s second election option and the DB underpin option
to form an Early Exercise type DB underpin plan. We summarize some key characteristics
of the option, such as convexity and monotonicity. Also, we provide illustrations of the
behavior of the early exercise region, and specifically include the situation where the Early
Exercise DB underpin simplifies to the DB underpin plan.
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Our numerical illustrations demonstrate that, although the Early Exercise DB underpin
option may end up costing more than both the DB underpin option and the second election
option combined, it does not cost more than 10% of the DB plan in general. In cases when
the relative cost of the option compared with the DB plan is very large, for example when
the risk-free rate is high or salary growth rate is low, the actual cost of the Early Exercise
DB underpin plan is indeed smaller.
The Early Exercise DB underpin plan shifts more risk and cost to the employer com-
pared with a DB plan, so it may not be an attractive option for pension sponsors, but the
overall costs can be managed to some extent by varying the DC contribution rate and the
DB accrual rate. Furthermore, it offers an attractive portable benefit for younger employ-
ees, which should help with recruitment, and offers a substantial retention benefit for older
employees. It offers predictable income in retirement, popular with employees and labour
unions. More importantly, we illustrate the simplicity in constructing new hybrid designs
that are naturally linked to existing pension structures.
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Chapter 3
An Intergenerational Risk Sharing
Plan
3.1 Introduction
Most existing hybrid pension plans were designed to re-allocate risk between employers
and employees, for example, the Cash Balance plan, the DB underpin plan, and the second
election option discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. These hybrids utilize financial option-like
benefits which create excessive risk and volatility to employers when they go unhedged.
For example, the Cash Balance plan carries significant risk to employers during the accu-
mulation phase, and leaves significant decumulation risks to the members, which does not
really address the problems of DB or DC plans.
Recently, there has been growing interest in collective pension designs, often known
as Intergenerational Risk Sharing (IRS) plans, where risk is distributed across different
generations. In comparison to DB and DC plans, IRS plans emphasize sustainability and
smoothness of consumption, meaning that both the contribution volatility and the benefit
volatility are reduced.
The development of IRS plans remains in the discussion stage, with only a few practical
examples, including some types of Target Benefit plan in Canada and the Collective DC
example from the Netherlands. However, numerous IRS plans have been proposed in
the literature over the past decade. Goecke (2013) and Bams et al. (2016) study a plan
where each participant has an individual notional account with crediting rates based on the
asset/liability ratio of the entire pension fund. The members continue to participate in the
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plan after the retirement date, with income varying according to the account balance at the
beginning of each period. Cui et al. (2011), Khorasanee (2012) and ? consider a pension
plan where both the contribution and the retirement benefit are adjusted by the asset level
of the pension fund. Gollier (2008) and Wang et al. (2018) formulate an optimal control
problem that jointly solves for the optimal portfolio strategy and risk-sharing strategy
for a target benefit plan. Boes and Siegmann (2018) suggest setting up an additional
insurance fund to smooth retirement benefits. Bovenberg and Mehlkopf (2014) consider
non-overlapping generations where a linear function of investment risk is transferred to
the next generation. Most of the aforementioned papers demonstrate that introducing IRS
features enhances the aggregate utility, which is termed the welfare function.
One attractive feature of the IRS plan is its ability to smooth the effect of investment
and longevity risks. In a DC plan, an individual account balance is highly volatile, based
on investment experience, and the retirement income is extremely sensitive to the interest
rate at the annuitization date (we assume annuitization). On the other hand, when a DB
plan remains under-funded for years, its employees bear the risk of sudden changes in the
plan structure, either through a reduction in their accrued benefit or as a substantial rise
in their contribution, depending on the bargaining power of active workers and retirees1.
In contrast, a well-structured IRS plan can benefit from the collective risk-sharing mech-
anism to provide members with more stable lifetime income. In our model, we determine
the optimal IRS design for all current and future employees by minimizing the average
squared and linear deviation between the actual consumption and a pre-set target. Similar
objectives have been considered in other pension-related literature. Gerrard et al. (2004)
study the optimal investment strategies in a DC plan during the decumulation period,
assuming that retirees are making constant withdrawals. Gerrard et al. (2006) incorporate
the bequest motive, and add withdrawn income as an additional control variable. Wang
et al. (2018) adopt the framework to an IRS plan with contribution fixed. They are able
to derive explicit solutions for both the optimal investment strategy as well as the optimal
risk sharing structure.
Our main contribution is to address the issue of intergenerational fairness, of which the
discussion is scarce in the current IRS literature. Specifically, we illustrate that for the
unconstrained optimal control approach in the study of IRS plans (ex. Cui et al. (2011) and
Wang et al. (2018)) may sacrifice the interests of nearby cohorts for the benefit of future
generations. We provide explanations for the abnormal investment strategies observed
in the previous literature. In addition, we demonstrate how introducing a regulatory
constraint would enhance the fairness across generations. Most of our analysis resides on
a stylized IRS plan which is similar to Cui et al. (2011), where the structure is transparent
1Assuming employees pay all the contribution, implicitly or explicitly.
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and easy to understand. We illustrate the appropriateness of such a design by showing its
connection with the optimal IRS structure derived from stochastic control problems.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce the notation and models
used in the subsequent sections. In Section 3.3 we derive the optimal IRS structure using
two different measures and demonstrate the drawbacks of the unconstrained framework.
In Section 3.4 we reformulate the problem and provide explicit solutions. In Section 3.5 we
incorporate a regulatory requirement in the constrained optimization and discuss its effect
on the pension design. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model Setup
We adopt a multi-period overlapping generations model for the population structure. All
new employees are assumed to live for N = 60 years, during which they work for R = 40
years and retire for N −R = 20 years. We denote by Π the fraction of retirees in the
population. As a benchmark, we standardize the unit so that there is exactly one person
at each age, and the number of living generations is 60 with Π = 1/3. We do not consider
demographic changes, but one may easily extend Π to be a time-dependent process, Πt in
which case there will be different numbers in each cohort.
The IRS plan discussed here can be regarded as a DB plan with risk-sharing features
based on the investment performance. Before introducing the IRS structure, we consider a
benchmark de-risked DB plan which is fully funded through fixed employee contributions
of p per year, paid continuously, invested in risk-free assets. In this simplified set up there
is no remaining asset or demographic risk. Given p, the annual retirement benefit for each
retiree, denoted b, can be calculated based on the equivalence principle of present values:







In other words, an individual’s total contribution is actuarially equivalent to his/her re-
tirement benefit. Here we ignore the inflation risk by normalizing the employee’s income
to be 1 in real terms; the same assumption is made in Cui et al. (2011).
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In reality, although plan sponsors are increasing their holdings in fixed-income securi-
ties, a complete de-risking strategy is rare, and investment risk remains the main source
of income or contribution volatility. The overall allocation of funds in equities, real es-
tate, hedge funds and other equity-type investments typically represents more than 50%
of pension plan assets2. Intergenerational risk sharing plans allow the investment risks to
be smoothed over time, and across generations, by simultaneously adjusting benefits and
contributions in response to variable investment returns.
Let p and b denote target values for contributions and benefits respectively. These
are used to determine the liability, L, which is constant over time as the population is
stationary, and as we are assuming a fixed rate of interest for the valuation. Let Xt denote
the value of the plan assets at t, and pt and bt denote the contribution and benefit rates at
t, respectively, which are adjusted to reflect the risk sharing resulting from the uncertainty
in the asset values.
We define the individual consumption level ct as the amount of income for each individ-
ual at t, after deducting contributions for workers (taxes are not considered in our setting).
We have normalized the setting such that workers’ earnings are 1 per year (in real terms),
so the consumable income is ct = 1− pt for active workers and ct = bt for retirees.
We assume the assets, Xt are invested in a mixture of a bank account with risk-free
return, and an equity following a Geometric Brownian Motion with drift µ and volatility
σ. The stochastic differential equation (SDE) for Xt is
dXt = (Xt (r + ωt(µ− r)) +N(1− Π)pt −NΠbt) dt+ ωtσXtdZt, X0 = x0
= µX(Xt, ωt, pt, bt)dt+ σX(Xt, ωt)dZt (3.1)
2Willis Towers Watson, 2017. “2016 asset allocations in Fortune 1000 pension plans”. Available at
https://www.towerswatson.com/
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where ωt is the weight of the portfolio invested in equity and Zt is a standard Brownian
Motion. Let (Ω,F ,P) be the complete probability space, where F = {Ft, t ≥ 0} is the
P-augmented filtration generated by {Zt, t ≥ 0}.
Notice that the forms of ωt, pt, and bt are unknown at this point. We define the set of
admissible strategies π = {(ωu, pu, bu)}u∈[t,∞) as follows:
Definition 1. (Admissible Strategy) For any fixed t ∈ [0,∞), a strategy
π = {(ωu, pu, bu)}u∈[t,∞)
is said to be admissible if




µX(x, ωu, pu, bu)
2 + σX(x, ωu)
2du] < +∞, ∀T > 0, ∀x ∈ IR
3. (Xπ, π) is the unique solution to (3.1).
and we denote A as the set of all admissible strategies π.
Later in this chapter, when we prespecify the risk-sharing structure (the form of pt and
bt), we can easily modify the above definition for the strategy π = {ωu}u∈[t,∞) and the
corresponding admissible set A.
A simple and intuitive example of an IRS plan is given in Cui et al. (2011). In this plan,
a portion of the surplus or deficit in the plan (represented by Xt − L) is distributed to the
current employees as an adjustment to the pension contribution, and/or to the retirees,
as an adjustment to the benefit. In the notation defined above, this can be described as
follows:
pt = p− α
Xt − L
# of Active Workers
= p− α Xt − L
N(1− Π)







This means that a portion (α + β) of the total surplus or deficit (Xt − L) is distributed
to participants through reducing/increasing contributions for active workers, and increas-
ing/reducing the benefit for retirees. We will refer back to this plan design in the following
sections, as we derive optimal forms for pt and bt under a range of assumptions and con-
straints.
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3.3 Optimal Pension Design Without Constraints
In this section we formulate the optimal control problems to derive optimal forms of pt and
bt, together with the optimal investment strategy ωt. We consider two objective functions.
The first targets overall expected utility; the second targets consumption smoothness. We
provide the explicit solutions to both cases, and show that neither case gives satisfactory
results without further refinement.
3.3.1 Optimal Control - Welfare Function
The ability to trade between generations can be welfare improving, as demonstrated by, for
example, Merton (1983), Gordon and Varian (1988), and Diamond (1965). This idea has
been implemented through the social security (or government benefit for seniors) in many
countries, but has not been widely applied in the occupational pension context. Here, we
follow the standard interpretation of welfare improving from the economics literature, that
is, maximizing the utility of the consumption paths, through work and retirement phases,
using a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function, U(t, c) = e−δt c
1−γ
1−γ where
δ ≥ 0 is the discount rate and γ > 1 is the risk aversion parameter3. For mathematical
convenience, we do not differentiate the risk averasion level for active workers and for
retirees, thus, γ is interpreted as the average risk aversion level throughout an individual’s
lifetime.
The goal is to maximize the aggregate utility for all generations, taking both the in-
vestment strategy and the risk-sharing structure as control variables. That is, we find

















Proposition 6. For the optimal control problem (3.3), the optimal asset allocation policy
3Zhang et al. (2018) estimate e−δ has mean of 0.965 and median of 0.997, and γ to be between 1.74
and 3.74, based on Ontario residents between age 50 and 80.
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b̂t = b+ β
P
(




and the corresponding value function is given by




where the expressions A, B, ψPw , ψ
P
r , α




















































Proof. The solution can be easily obtained through standard Hamilton-Jacobian-Bellman






















Then, by the conjecture that v(x) = (A+Bx)
1−γ
1−γ (which implies that v
′′ < 0), we substitute
the expression into the HJB equation to obtain the explicit solution. Notice that the
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expression for b̂t can be rearranged:
b̂t = B
−1/γ(A+BXt)
= B−1/γA+B1−1/γψPr L︸ ︷︷ ︸
set it to be b and derive ψPr
+NΠB1−1/γ
(




Then p̂t can be derived based on the relation between b, L and p. Lastly, by a standard
verification argument (for example, see Touzi (2013)), we can conclude that V P = v.
Remark. The optimal solution is close to the IRS plan proposed in Cui et al. (2011)
(Equation 3.2), with the difference being that the risk sharing is not based on the full
surplus Xt − L, but on an adjusted surplus, Xt − ψPwL for the workers’ contributions and
Xt − ψPr L for the retirees’ benefits.
Here we see that ψPr and ψ
P
w are implicitly determined when we fix the target contri-
bution (p). Alternatively, we may choose to specify ψPw and implicitly derive values for p,
b and ψPr . The values of α
P and βP are independent of the choice of p, b, ψPw and ψ
P
r ,
and are guaranteed to be positive. It is interesting to observe that when the retirees have
a lower benchmark consumption level than the active employees (1 − p > b), they enjoy
a prior claim on the surplus, and have a lower threshold for deficit contributions (since
ψPw > ψ
P
r ). The risk sharing parameters α and β depend on the population structure,
the optimal design provide more consumption smoothing to larger population. Moreover,
a higher discount rate, which implies more preference of current consumption over the
future, results in less risk-sharing incentives.
The mathematical form of the optimal investment strategy also has a clear interpreta-
tion. As individuals become more risk-averse, that is, when γ is increased, the proportion
in the risky investment will be reduced. In addition, the amount of risky investment de-




we notice that when the working population increases (N(1 − Π) increases), the amount
of equity investment increases. This result aligns with the work by Teulings and De Vries
(2006), where the authors consider the optimal investment strategy for a pension fund
containing a group of individual Generational Accounts4.
However, the results from this exercise do not make sense in a practical context. The
values for ψPw and ψ
P
r may be negative, for reasonable values of p and other parameters,
4In a Generational Account (GA) scheme, investment decisions are made collectively, but there is no
risk-sharing feature.
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implying that the contributions are always below the benchmark, even if the plan is un-
derfunded, and benefits are always above the benchmark. Alternatively, again for quite
reasonable assumed parameters, the values of ψPw and ψ
P
r may be very large, indicating
excessive contributions and/or benefits. The SDE of the asset process under the optimal


































= (b1Xt + b2)dt+ (c1Xt + c2)dZt.












+ r, then the long term asset value will converge to N(1−Π)
r
.
However, this condition is often violated, and the long term asset value diverges to +∞.
3.3.2 Optimal Control - Stability of Consumption
The purpose of intergenerational risk sharing is to spread excess profits from the windfall
cohorts to support the benefits and contributions of the less fortunate cohorts, so a success-
ful IRS plan should help to limit the variability of both contributions and benefits across
generations. In this section we assume that the sponsor will set a target consumption
level for all individuals, and the goal is to minimize the squared deviation from the actual
consumption and the target consumption. This approach is similar to Wang et al. (2018),
and is more consistent with the purpose of the IRS than the utility approach. Further
discussion on the advantage of this stability measure will be presented in the next section.
For simplicity, we denote cw and cr as the target consumption levels of the active workers























where %r and %w are penalty weights for the negative deviation between the actual and
the target consumption. Here we want to mention that without taking inflation into
the consideration, our objective function also aligns with the economic concept of habit
formation preference. Individuals are used to a certain living standard and any deviation
from the target consumption would increase his/her disutility. Depending on the individual
risk preference (%r and %w), one may willing to take some risks on their consumption
level for the opportunity of better quality of living. Some discussions on the relationship
between quadratic loss function and habit formation in preference can be found in Bruhn
and Steffensen (2013).

























, b̂t = b+ β
S
(




and the value function is
vS =
(


























, αS = (1− Π)
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Proof. This ergodic control problem can be solved through standard HJB equations, where











((1− pt)− cw)2 − %w((1− pt)− cw)
)
+NΠ((bt − cr)2 − %r(bt − cr))
}
= v.






















> 0. Lastly, by standard
verification theorem (ex.Leizarowitz (1988), Leizarowitz (1990) and Stockbridge (1989)),






The optimal design shares exactly the same structure as in the welfare function case
and a more detailed comparison will be given in the following section. Here we make a few
highlights. First, as Xt →∞, ωt = − (µ−r)σ2 < 0, which means when the asset level is high,
the sponsor will take a short position in the risky asset. At first glance, this result is highly
counter-intuitive, but soon we will demonstrate that when Xt reaches a certain threshold,
all future benefits will be locked and payable through risk-free investment. In addition, any
increases in the target consumption level (cr and cw) will increase the risk-taking motive;
αS and βS do not depend on the choice of the target consumption levels cr and cw, nor
on the penalty parameters on negative returns %w and %r. Furthermore, when the penalty
terms %r and %w increase, more weight is put into the risky investment. Lastly, we are not








risk sharing parameters αS and βS are guaranteed to be positive.
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= (b1Xt + b2)dt+ (c1Xt + c2)dZt.












<∞, ∀r > 0.











ωt = 0 and dXt = 0, which implies that contribution (p̂t = 1 − cw − ρw2 ) plus the risk free




Unlike the utility maximization approach, the asset level in the consumption stability
approach will converge to a constant. However, there remain many practical issues with the
result; the thresholds ψsw and ψ
s




> 0 is too restrictive; and the optimal plan will eventually become a risk-free
DB plan. We explore these issues in the next section.
3.3.3 Numerical Illustration
In this subsection, we conduct numerical experiments and compare the pros and cons of
the two optimal pension designs derived in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present the optimal pension design with different risk-free rate
r. For the power utility case, we also compare the optimal design under different levels
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Figure 3.1: The Optimal Pension Design for Improving the Welfare Function
of risk aversion, with δ = 0.02 such that the discount factor is roughly 0.98. For the
target consumption case, we examine the effect of the penalty parameter of negative return
(assuming %r = %w, c
r and cw are fixed at 0.9) and the effect of target consumption




r . Notice that we did not provide
graphs for αS and βS as they are independent of %r, %r, c
r and cw. For the benchmark
case, we set µ = 0.08, σ = 0.25 and p = 0.1.
Immediately we notice that ψPr loses its financial interpretations when r is small (less
than around 0.03), or when r is large. ψPw suffers the same issue but only when r is small.
On the other hand, the target consumption case suffers the same interpretation issues when






. When r is larger, both ψSr and ψ
S
w appear much more reasonable.
Adjusting the values of %r, %w, c
w and cr does not solve this issue, and the optimal pension
design is not robust with respect to these input parameters.
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̺w = ̺r = 0
̺w = ̺r = 0.01
̺w = ̺r = 0.05
̺w = ̺r = 0.1
̺w = ̺r = 0.5











̺w = ̺r = 0
̺w = ̺r = 0.01
̺w = ̺r = 0.05
̺w = ̺r = 0.1
̺w = ̺r = 0.5
Figure 3.2: The Optimal Pension Design for Improving Consumption Stability
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3.4 Optimal Pension Design - Linear Risk Sharing
Structure
Despite the critical drawbacks in the unconstrained optimal control problem, it provides
theoretical suggestions with respect to the optimality of the linear risk sharing design.
Therefore, we now consider a stylized pension design that is similar to Cui et al. (2011),
where pt and bt have the following forms:










and where ψw and ψr are determined externally, for example, to align with regulatory
requirements. Cui et al. (2011) have demonstrated that their IRS plan is welfare improving
compared to either a DC or DB plan. The authors also calculate the optimal α, β and
p, by maximizing the utility of the lifetime consumption of a single generation. Here we
re-investigate the problem, and this section outlines the differences between our work and
Cui et al. (2011).
3.4.1 Consumption Stability of a Single Generation
In this and the following sections we use the second objective function from Section 3.3,
where we minimize the variability of individual consumption. The reason is that the
utility function approach is unable to reflect the advantages of IRS plans in consumption
smoothing. Pure DC or DB plans solely focus on the stability of income either during
the pre-retirement or the post-retirement period, but not both (we assume the DB plan
is a contribution adjustable plan, where deficit leads to higher contributions from active
workers). The quadratic function that measures the squared difference between target and
actual consumption would better fit this purpose.
To begin with, we consider the single generation model, by replacing the utility function
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in Cui et al. (2011) with a quadratic function, and defining the value function as:









(cw − bs)2 − %r(bs − cr)ds
∣∣∣∣Ft] , (3.7)
where dXt = (Xt(r + ωt(µ− r)) +Rpt − (N −R)bt) dt+ ωtσXtdZt.
The optimal pension design can be easily obtained by static optimization:
(p̂, α̂, β̂) = arg min
p,α,β
V (t, x; p, α, β)
In this section, we will provide the explicit solution to (3.7). For clarity, we write the value
function such that:


















, i = 1








N(1−Π) , i = 1
− β
NΠ












, i = 2,
dXt = [Xt(a1 + ωta2) + a3]dt+ ωtσXtdZt,
a1 = r − α− β, a2 = (µ− r),
a3 = N(1− Π)(p+ b)−Nb+ (αψw + βψr)L.





, t ∈ [R,N ]
−a2(2P (t)Xt+Q(t))
2σ2XtP (t)
, t ∈ [0, R],
(3.8)
and the value function is
V (t, x) =
{
A(t)x2 +B(t)x+ C(t), t ∈ [R,N ]
P (t)x2 +Q(t)x+W (t), t ∈ [0, R],
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Proof. The explicit solution can be derived similarly to Gerrard et al. (2004) and Wang
et al. (2018). The objective function changes at time R and we need to iteratively derive









+ (ρ2 + λ2x)
2 + ν2 = 0, (t, x) ∈ ([R,N ]× IR) .
By substituting V (t, x) = A(t)x2 + B(t)x + C(t), we obtained that A(t) > 0. Then by
standard verification theorem, we have derived the solution for t ∈ [R,N ]. Since V (R, x)
satisfies the quadratic growth condition, then the results in Touzi (2012) can be directly
applied so that the value function at time t ∈ [0, R] can be expressed as









Following the exact same procedure as before, we derived the solution.
3.4.2 Multi-generation problem
Since multiple cohorts are participating in the intergenerational risk-sharing plan, designing
the optimal pension structure based on any particular generation will inevitably violate
the interests of the others. Figure 3.3 provides a fan-chart (5% to 95% quantiles) that
displays an example of the optimal investment ω̂t under the single generation model via
simulation. Notice that there is a significant change in the portfolio weights near the
retirement date. Similar patterns can be found in Cui et al. (2011) with a power utility
function. The observation is consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis for a single generation;
however, this approach sacrifices the interests of all other generations, which misses the
main objective of the IRS framework. Therefore, a multi-generation approach is necessary.
In the multi-generation approach we consider the financial stability of all generations
up to time T, giving an objective function:





N(1− Π){(cw − (1− ps))2 − %w(1− ps − cw)}
+NΠ{(cr − bs)2 − %r(bs − cr)}ds+ %1(XT − d)2 − %2XT
∣∣Ft] (3.9)
The choice of finite T can be arbitrary, but it is necessary to include the penalty terms
%1(XT − d)2 and %2XT to ensure that the interests of generations beyond time T will not
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Figure 3.3: The 90% fan-chart of the optimal portfolio weight on equity under the single
generation model %r = %w = 0, α = β = 0.1 and p = 0.2.
be ignored. It would be more satisfying and less arbitrary to consider T → ∞ which will
be present in the following section. Similarly to the single-generation case, we simplify the
notation such that:



























ν = N(1− Π)(ρ1 − %w)ρ1 +NΠ(ρ2 − %r)ρ2 − θη2,
ρi =
{
cw − 1 + p+ αψw
N(1−Π)L i = 1
cr − b+ βψr
NΠ
L i = 2,
dXt = [Xt(a1 + ωta2) + a3]dt+ ωtσXtdZt,
a1 = r − α− β, a2 = (µ− r),
a3 = N(1− Π)(p+ b)−Nb+ (αψw + βψr)L.
Proposition 9. For the optimal control problem (3.9), the optimal asset allocation is
ω̂(t;T ) =




and the value function has the following form:












































+B2(T − t)eB1(T−t), a1 = 0



















+ θη2 + ν
)
ds
A1 = 2a1 −
a22
σ2











B3 − 2θη − 2a3%1
B1




The proof is exactly the same as in the single-generation case.
Remark. When each individual follows their own optimal asset allocation (3.7), then the























where C is a constant. However, it is only in special cases where ω̂S∑(Xt) = ω̂(t;T ). An
example would be α = 0, r = β, cw = 1 − p and cr = b. Otherwise, it is simple to show
that ω̂S∑(Xt) 6= ω̂(t;T ). This illustrates that the group optimality cannot be achieved at the
individual level.
3.4.3 Infinite Time Horizon (T →∞)
The terminal condition in the multi-generation problem involves subjective choice of the
penalty term %2. We now focus on ensuring the long-term sustainability of the pension plan
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by letting T →∞. To avoid an infinite value function, we calculate the long-term average
consumption dispersion from the target, to form an ergodic control problem similar to the










N(1− Π)((cw − (1− ps))2 − %w(1− ps − cw))
+NΠ((cr − bs)2 − %r(bs − cr))ds
]
. (3.11)














where all notations are kept the same as in Section 3.4.2.



































and the value function is















)2 , B = 2Aa3 + 2θη−(r − α− β) + (µ−r
σ
)2 .
The proof follows exactly as Section 3.3.2.






< 0, we can show the relationship between the
optimal control problems (3.9) and (3.11). It is trivial to notice that limT→∞B(t;T ) = B
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and limT→∞A(t;T ) = A, and since limT→∞
A(t;T )
T
= 0 and limT→∞
B(t;T )
T























































































V (t, x;T ) = v and limT→∞ ω̂(t;T ) = ω̂t. This continuity feature
ensures that the optimal pension design derived from (3.9) with sufficiently long horizon
will be close to the optimal pension design in (3.11).
Remark. Similarly to Section 3.3.2, the explicit solution is given on a subset of parameters.
However, the condition differs in that the risk-sharing parameters α and β are involved.
In the next section, we will demonstrate that when a regulatory constraint is included, the






< 0 is automatically satisfied.
3.5 Optimal Pension Design with Regulatory Con-
straints
In this section, we will illustrate that the unconstrained optimization problem discussed in
Section 3.4 has similar issues as the optimal control problems in Section 3.3.
3.5.1 Regulatory Constraint
When the pension plan is designed for the long-term financial stability of all participants,
the interest of any particular generation would not be important. Therefore, the “opti-
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mal” plan, in the mathematical sense, may sacrifice the current generation. The “optimal”
strategy ensures the asset is able to achieve a certain funding level, where all future pay-
ments can be guaranteed through the risk-free investment. An example of the portfolio
weight is given in Figure 3.4. Possible ways to alleviate this issue include: incorporating a
discount factor, selecting appropriate penalty parameters (%r and %w), fixing the maturity
time T , and constraining the parameter space. However, most of these are not suitable in
our context. The discount factor, penalty terms and fixed maturity date, all suffer from
interpretation issues, along with subjective choices of the values. Although it is natural to
set constraints on the portfolio weight (ex, ω ≤ ωt ≤ ω̄), it may not solve the problem as
the primary issue comes from the unreasonable α and β in the optimal pension structure.
Figure 3.4: The 90% fan-chart of the optimal portfolio weight on equity under the multi-
generation model, with T →∞, using the ‘optimal’ parameters.
Therefore, the optimization must be done under some restricted domain for the risk-
sharing parameters. Setting α and β to be between 0 and 1 would be a natural choice, but
more restrictive constraints can be applied to align with regulatory requirements.
When a deficit occurs, sponsors are often required to create a recovery plan that is
expected to clear the deficit within a specified period. The risk-sharing feature in the IRS
plan will quicken the recovery process, and in particular, the funding level can be recovered
through risk-free investment. In our analysis, we define the recovery period as the number
of years that the pension fund will need to return to the target level if all assets are invested
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in the risk-free bond. Specifically, for the target funding ratio of fr, we define
t∗ = inf
{







where dXt = (rXt −N(1− Π)pt +NΠbt) dt.
Theoretically, one can use any investment strategy in defining the recovery period;
however, it would be illogical to consider the investment strategy before the decision of
the pension structure. Therefore, the calculation of the recovery period should be based
on objective methods. There are at least three options available: using industry standard
practice (for example, using the average portfolio in the pension industry); using the risk-
free assets (the conservative choice); and the “optimal” choice, for example, Equation
(3.12). We should mention that the “optimal” choice may become subjective if the objective
function is utility based (where each pension plan has their own risk aversion parameter).
In this section, we use the risk-free investment.
It is easy to recognize the technical drawback of setting fr = ψr = ψw = 1 which
leads to a recovery time of infinity. Fortunately, from both the theoretical (Section 3.3)
and practical perspective, we can safely modify this assumption. For example, from the
Financial Toezichtskader (FTK), established by the Dutch National Bank, the pension
sponsor must implement a recovery plan when the funding level is below 123.9%, and
cut the pension benefit if the funding level is below 104.2% for five consecutive years; in
addition, no indexation is allowed if the funding level is below 110%.
For illustration purposes, we implement a simplified constraint in the following way.
Assume that the surplus/deficit is distributed at 110% funding level, ψr = ψw = 110%, and
that regulation requires that, if the plan is below 90% funded, it must schedule payments
to achieve 105% funding within 10 years. Of course, in practice, constraints are more
complicated, but the general idea is captured. When ψr = ψw = ψ, the constraint on
the recovery period can be transformed into a constraint on the risk-sharing parameter





















is the initial funding level. Figure 3.5 presents the recovery period for each deficit
level back to 105%, using the largest risk-sharing parameters studied by Cui et al. (2011)
(α = 0.06, β = 0.02). Notice that when the funding level is 90%, the recovery period is
about 17 years, which is above most regulatory requirements, which are generally in the
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range of 5 to 10 years. The recovery period remains high for any reasonable choice of the
risk-free rate.





















Figure 3.5: The recovery period when α = 0.06 and β = 0.02.
To apply the regulatory constraint, we denote the mandatory recovery period to be tr,
which is set to be 10 in our benchmark examples. We are trying to find ξ that solves the
equation:
t∗(ξ)− tr = 0




∣∣∣∣t∗(ξ′) = tr,(dt∗(ξ)dξ < 0, ∀ξ > ξ′
)}
, (3.15)
such that ξ∗ is the largest parameter that satisfies the regulatory constraint. Then the
constrained parameter domain is simply
{
(α, β)
∣∣ξ∗ ≤ α + β ≤ 1, α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0}.
Proposition 11. If fr−f0
(ψ−1)r > tr, then ξ
∗ exists and ξ∗ > r.
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(fr − 1)r + (ψ − fr)ξ



















(fr − 1)r + (ψ − fr)ξ
(f0 − 1)r + (ψ − f0)ξ
]
+
(fr − x0)(1− ψ)r
((fr − 1)r + (ψ − fr)ξ)((f0 − 1)r + (ψ − f0)ξ)
}
.





(fr − 1)r + (ψ − fr)ξ







1− (f0 − fr)(r − ξ)










(f0 − 1)r + (ψ − f0)ξ
)2
(r − ξ)− 1
3
()3
(r − ξ)2 · · ·
)
If ξ > r then
∣∣ (f0−fr)(r−ξ)
(f0−1)r+(ψ−f0)ξ
∣∣ < 1, which ensures the convergence. By combining the first





(fr − f0)((fr − 1)r + (ψ − fr)ξ) + (fr − f0)(1− ψ)r
((fr − 1)r + (ψ − fr)ξ)((f0 − 1)r + (ψ − f0)ξ)
=
(fr − ψ)(fr − f0)(r − ξ)
((fr − 1)r + (ψ − fr)ξ)((f0 − 1)r + (ψ − f0)ξ)
> 0
All other terms in the Taylor expansion are positive, therefore dt
∗
dξ
< 0, when ξ > r.















(fr − f0)(ψ − 1)r





(ψ−1)r > tr, then ξ
∗ > r exists.
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Using our benchmark parameter set, the constraint is transformed to {0.1375 < α+β <
1, α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0}. Figure 3.6 displays the optimal weight in equity under the optimal pension
design given the regulatory constraints. Apparently the constrained optimal pension design
avoids the short-term over-investment in risky assets. Therefore, the nearby generations
will have a relatively stable income, and the issue of intergenerational unfairness is lessened.


























Figure 3.6: The 90% fan-chart of optimal portfolio weight on equity under the multi-
generation model with T →∞, using optimal parameters constrained by regulation. The
optimal parameters are α = 0.1084, β = 0.0292 and p = 0.2241, for a target consumption
of 0.9 throughout one’s life. The long term funding level is 117.26%.
3.5.2 Sensitivity Tests
This section performs sensitivity tests over different parameters, to check the robustness
of the optimal pension design.
Figure 3.7 presents the optimal pension design for different target consumption levels.
We have set cw, cr ∈ [0.9, 1.15] with cr < cw (target consumption level for retirees smaller
than for active workers). We kept µ = 0.08, r = 0.02, σ = 0.25, and ψr = ψw = 1.1, and
made the following observations:
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Figure 3.7: Sensitivity of optimal design over different cw and cr.
• α and β are extremely robust against changes in cw and cr. Although there is a
negative relation between the target consumption level and the pension parameters,
the scale is relatively small.
• When we increase cw, p is decreasing (less contribution) which also leads to a decrease
in benefit b and liability value, which increases the long term funding level. Exactly
the opposite observation can be made for cr. However, p remains relatively stable in
[0.2, 0.28].
• As the target consumption levels increase, it is intuitive to expect that the required
funding level also increases. Therefore, it is not surprising to observe a strong positive
relationship between long-term funding level and the target consumption. Again, the
long-term funding level is quite robust and lays in the range of [1.15, 1.3].
The last observation is interesting since it suggests the necessity of reasonable over-funding,
and coincides with the current regulations on DB plans in the Netherlands (where full
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indexation of DB plans is permissible only when the funding level is above 130%). It also
indicates that strict tax limits on surplus should be reconsidered to achieve funding and
benefit stability.













































































Figure 3.8: Sensitivity of optimal design over different µ and r, when cw = cr = 1.
Figure 3.8 presents the optimal pension design for different equity returns µ and risk-
free rates r. We have set cw = cr = 1; all other assumptions are unchanged. We make the
following observations:
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• The optimal pension design is robust with respect to µ, which is desirable as there
is significant uncertainty in estimating the expected equity return.
• The optimal pension design is sensitive to the risk-free rate, r. Part of the reason
for this depends on the relationship between b and p, such that a small increase in r
may substantially increase the value of the retirement benefit b. The hump observed
in α will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
• Increases in the risk-free rate allow more risk-sharing in the pension design.
• Increases in r mean less contribution is required for the same amount of benefits, and
thus lead to a decrease in p.
• The long term funding level is between 1.1 and 1.3. In a low interest rate environ-
ment the optimal pension design will achieve a long term funding level in the range
[1.15, 1.3].
3.5.3 Optimality of Pure DC or DB Plan
In this section we comment further on designing the optimal intergenerational risk-sharing
pension, and on selecting the appropriate target consumption level. Figure 3.9 presents the
same sensitivity test as Figure 3.8, except the target consumption is cw = cr = 0.9. The
hump of α in Figure 3.8 has been replaced by a cut-off when the interest rate is between
0.04 and 0.05. This is caused by the situation where the optimal benchmark consumption
level (1−p) for active employees is larger than their target consumption level (1−p > cw),
in which case the optimal IRS plan collapses to a DC plan. In fact, when the interest rate
is high, the target consumption level is achievable through risk-free investment, and the
ultimate long term weight in equity becomes negative.
This issue can be resolved in two ways: either by taking %w > 0 and %r > 0, or by
raising the target consumption level. Since the equity return is above the risk-free rate,
increasing the risky investment should lead to a higher expected future benefit than b (and
lower contribution than p). Therefore, it is reasonable to set a consumption goal that is
higher than 1 for employees to participate in market growth.
Figure 3.10 demonstrates the increasing effectiveness of the intergenerational risk-
sharing structure as we increase the target consumption level. We plot the value function
v for different α and β under the optimal p. The grid surface represents the value func-
tion, and the vertical plane represents the regulatory requirement on α + β. The optimal
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Figure 3.9: Sensitivity of optimal design over different µ and r, when cw = cr = 0.9.
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pension design is the minimum point on the intersection between the regulatory plane and
the value function grid surface (the red line). The optimal design is close to a traditional
DB plan when cw = cr = 0.9, except that the market risk borne by the active employees is
smoothed across time (α 6= 1). As cw increases from 0.9 to 1.1, the optimal design moves
away from the DB plan.
(a) cw = 0.9, cr = 0.9, r = 0.025 (b) cw = 1.1, cr = 1.1, r = 0.025
Figure 3.10: The value function under different α and β with optimal p, the red line is the
intersection between the regulatory constraint (blue plane) and the value function surface.
As a final note, we have not discussed the risk from demographic changes, which is an
important reason why the IRS plan should be more effective than the DB plan. A well-
designed IRS should have the ability to smooth both market risk and the risk associated
with population structure. Figure 3.11 duplicates Figure 3.10 with R = 36 (Π = 0.4
instead of 1/3). Clearly, as the number of retirees increases, more risk is to be shared
between generations.
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(a) cw = 0.9, cr = 0.9, r = 0.025 (b) cw = 1.1, cr = 1.1, r = 0.025
Figure 3.11: The value function under different α and β with optimal p, when the percent-
age of retirees is Π = 0.4, the red line is the intersection between the regulatory constraint
(blue plane) and the value function surface.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied a stylized intergenerational risk-sharing structure that
is similar to that in Cui et al. (2011). We provided some theoretical justification for our
pension structure and illustrate some shortcomings in the existing research. We incorpo-
rated a regulatory requirement as a natural constraint to our optimization process, which
enhances the fairness across generations. In addition, we demonstrated that the impact of




This thesis explores three topics in hybrid pension plans, namely, the hedging strategy, the
liability valuation and the optimal hybrid design. This chapter discusses future work on
each topic.
Chapter 1 investigates the performance of dynamic hedging strategies on Cash Balance
Pension Plans, using the popular one- and two-factor Hull White model. Although the
liability valuation is quite robust with respect to the choice of the models, hedging results
are sensitive to the underlying assumption and thus more sophisticated models should be
considered. In addition, since the pension funds are unlikely to rebalance their portfolio in
short horizon, static or semi-static hedging strategies should be investigated.
Chapter 2 illustrates how new hybrid pension designs can be created to flexibly fulfill
the needs for both sponsors and employees. However, our assumptions are oversimplified;
for example, salaries can only be partially hedged in the market, interest rates and annuity
factors should not be constant over the time, and longevity risk in DB plans cannot be
ignored. Without addressing the aforementioned issues, our valuation is likely to underesti-
mate the true risks embedded in the plan. Moreover, our valuation is based on a sponsor’s
conservative views; quantitative analysis from an employee’s perspective should also be
performed. A more comprehensive comparison between the sponsors’ cost and employees’
utility gain should be studied to assess the feasibility of the new design.
Chapter 3 studies the fairness issue in the intergenerational risk sharing pension plan.
Both our underlying model and plan structure are stylized. The fixed population structure,
the exclusion of sponsor’s responsibility, and the simple Geometric Brownian Motion for
the financial market have all limited the practicality of our results. In addition, other than
the optimal design of the IRS plan, another practical issue is on the optimal transition
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from an existing pension plan to the new IRS plan. The goal of achieving long-term
sustainability of a pension fund may conflict with the interests of the current retirees. How
to reform the current pension system without violating the equality and equity among
different generations remains an unsolved question.
Essentially, pension reform is a collective bargaining agreement, that involves policy-
makers, pension sponsors, pension trusts, labour unions, retirees, current workers and all
future generations. Most current literature resides on the interests of one party only, with
limited discussions that involve more than two parties. Considerably more effort should
be made on strategic balancing of interests between different stakeholders.
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Appendix A
A.1 Continuous Crediting Based on the k-year spot
rate: one-factor HW Model
This section and the following three sections provide formulae for valuation factors. De-
tailed proofs can be found in Hardy et al. (2014) and Zhu (2015). For CB plans with the
k-year spot rate as the continuous crediting rate, the valuation factor using the one-factor
HW model is
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γ = 1− B(a, k)
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The price of zero coupon bond P (t, T ) can be regarded as a special case such that
P (t, T ) = Pγ=1(t, T ).
A.2 Discrete Crediting Based on the k-year spot rate:
one-factor HW Model
A CB plan with the k-year spot rate as the crediting rate and crediting frequency n times
per year, has the valuation factor using the one-factor HW model
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fM(0, t) is the observed instantaneous forward rate at time t, and A(t, T ), B(a, k) are
defined in the previous section.
A.3 Continuous Crediting Based on the k-year spot
rate: two-factor HW Model
For a CB plan with the k-year spot rate as the continuous crediting rate, the valuation
factor using the two-factor HW model is














exp (A∗(t, T )− γ(a1, k)B(a1, T − t)x(t)− γ(a2, k)B(a2, T − t)y(t))
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γ(aj, k) = 1−
B(aj, k)
k
, j = 1, 2
A.4 Discrete Crediting Based on the k-year spot rate:
two-factor HW Model
The CB plan with the k-year spot rate as the crediting rate and crediting frequency n
times per year, has the valuation factor using the two-factor HW model
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Appendix B
B.1 Price of Second Election
Here we provide the pricing formulae for second election option under three scenarios.
Milevsky and Promislow (2004) has provide more analytic insights relating to the cost
function.
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